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ABSTRACT 
This research will examine the collateral psychological and political damage of the 
United States drone warfare program on Pakistani society in the Federally Administered 
Tribal Areas (FATA), to determine if this is an effective proactive homeland defense 
tactic. The use of drone aircraft by the United States government has increased 
worldwide since this evolving technology was first utilized in 2001. Each drone strike 
impacts militants, noncombatants, and ordinary civilians. The potential for collateral 
damage and civilian casualties may overshadow the tactical gain of even successful drone 
strikes by inspiring radicalization, and creating recruiting opportunities for militants.  
The findings of this research will recommend an alternative framework from 
which to evaluate the effectiveness of drone warfare, based on the collateral 
psychological and political impact on society in this region. Traditional studies of drone 
warfare have tended to analyze from a tactical perspective. The examination of drone 
warfare, based on the damage done to the psychological experiences and political 
attitudes of FATA residents who may turn against the U.S., provides policy makers with 
the ability to better assess the impact of drone strikes on communities, and determine the 
optimal situation to leverage this lethal tactic, while minimizing negative outcomes. 
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A. RESEARCH QUESTION 
This thesis examines the impact of drone warfare in the FATA region of Pakistan 
and the impact it has on society. It will focus on the collateral psychological and political 
damage within the FATA region when drone strikes occur. Each drone strike impacts 
militants, non-combatants among the general population, and innocent civilians. The 
potential for collateral damage and civilian casualties may overshadow the tactical gain 
by inspiring radicalization and recruitment of militants. The operational successes and 
failures of this program will be assessed to make policy recommendations about future 
drone use.  
B. STATEMENT OF PROBLEM 
The purpose of this research will be to analyze the collateral psychological and 
political damage of drone warfare on the Pakistani population, and use these findings to 
make policy recommendations about future drone use. It will be begin with an overall 
tactical assessment of the program’s successes and failures from the standpoint of the 
U.S. military. The collateral psychological and political impact will then be assessed 
through the theoretical lens of such frameworks as displaced aggression, honor and 
shame, learned helplessness, narcissistic rage, and love of death. Are these feelings and 
behaviors inflamed by drone tactics, and does this diminish the value of drone warfare? 
The proposed results of this research are recommendations on how to best leverage 
drones, while minimizing the negative collateral psychological and political impact.  
By researching U.S. drone warfare in Pakistan, I will analyze this tactic as an 
effective proactive strategy that defends U.S. interests abroad, and prevents future threats 
from reaching the homeland. Little attention has been given to the long-term collateral 
psychological and political impact that drone strikes have had on the overall stability of 
the region, and whether the drone campaign is truly diminishing the capabilities of al-
Qaeda or the Taliban. The flow of radicals waiting to take the place of those killed by 
drones seems to be endless, and should make us question whether drone strikes are an 
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effective method of fighting militant groups. There is evidence that drone strikes inspire 
recruitment, retaliation, and further radicalization of the population but these behaviors 
may have occurred independent of the drone program. I will seek to determine if the 
value of drone strikes in protecting American lives outweighs the negative reactions in 
the Islamic world that retaliate against U.S. interests. The strong influence of al-Qaeda 
and the Taliban in FATA makes neutral and reliable sources of information difficult to 
find in this region.   
Analysis of this topic is necessary, because drone technology will be with us 
throughout the foreseeable future, and will remain an attractive military and foreign 
policy option. Research from a psychological and political perspective is an original 
method to determine the effectiveness of this new and continually evolving technology. 
Some officials in the U.S. State Department and National Security Council state that 
many of the drone strikes against low-level targets are counterproductive, because these 
militants are easily replaceable and not worth the civilian casualties that destabilize the 
Pakistani government. Many question whether the U.S. can kill its way out of the 
problem without sufficient regard for military or diplomatic repercussions in the region. 
This research will assess the policy challenge of U.S. drone warfare to determine 
its strengths and weaknesses as it is currently being employed. Can this policy be 
improved based on the study of the collateral psychological and political damage drone 
strikes inflict on the people of FATA? In the conclusion, this thesis will make 
recommendations to strengthen drone warfare by focusing on the tactical advantage it 
provides, and devising strategies to minimize the negative affect on the Pakistani people. 
It provides decision makers a framework of when to leverage drones and what situations 
are not conducive to drone strikes when their negative potential outweighs potential 
tactical gain.  
1. Description of Method 
a. Sample 
This research studies both the U.S. drone warfare program in Pakistan and 
the collateral psychological and political impact it has had on the local people. It will 
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begin with a review of the overall tactical successes and failures of the drone warfare 
policy that has been leveraged by the U.S. military and intelligence community, to 
counter al-Qaeda and Taliban militants in the region. Then the specific impact on the 
Pakistani people, predominantly in the FATA region, will be analyzed from a 
psychological and political framework. Using the tactical assessment as a foundation, the 
collateral psychological and political damage will then be utilized to make policy 
recommendations on how to improve drone warfare.   
In order to determine how to improve drone warfare policy, it is 
imperative to understand the current use of drones. We cannot improve existing policy 
without understanding it, and examining its results. What are the pros and cons of 
leveraging drones from a tactical perspective? Is this program successful in targeting al-
Qaeda and Taliban militants? The study of drone warfare will provide a foundation from 
which to assess the impact of drones on the Pakistani people and make policy 
recommendations on how to best utilize drones. 
Analyzing the collateral psychological and political affects of drone 
strikes on the Pakistani people is a unique way to determine the effectiveness of drone 
warfare. To date, little psychological or political research has been conducted on this 
relatively new and rapidly evolving technology. There continues to be a great deal of 
debate as to whether drone strikes are eliminating militancy in the region or just creating 
and inspiring retaliation, recruitment, and further radicalization. Study of the Pakistani 
population may go a long way in determining the answer to this question and give U.S. 
decision makers key information on how to improve drone policy. 
b. Data Sources 
Locating sources of data for this thesis will be challenging because the 
drone warfare program is classified, and the U.S. does not officially comment on 
operations or policy. Since most drone strikes occur in the FATA region of Pakistan, 




heavy influence of the Taliban and al-Qaeda. Statistics and facts are easily manipulated 
by the different competing sides because reliable and neutral sources are not able to 
access the region.  
Scholarly sources will be utilized to analyze the tactical effectiveness of 
drone warfare. A small group of academics have begun reviewing U.S. drone strategy as 
world scrutiny has increased in recent years. Andrew Foust has provided multiple journal 
articles for this research and Williams (2010) provides valuable analysis. The collateral 
psychological and political damage analysis will also be based on scholarly sources. 
Topics such as displaced aggression, honor and shame, learned helplessness, narcissistic 
rage, and love of death have been researched extensively, and will be utilized to assess 
the impact of drones on the Pakistani people. The Pew Research Center and New 
America Foundation poll show negative feelings toward the U.S. and its drone program, 
which may be indicative of these sentiments among FATA residents and Pakistanis. 
Newspaper articles will provide specific information about recent drone strikes including 
pieces by Ken Dilanian of the Los Angeles Times. Sources such as these will be the basis 
of individual case studies of particular drone strikes and a depiction of the resulting 
impact.  
The New America Foundation, and in particular Peter Bergen and 
Katherine Tiedemann, has been researching drone warfare in the FATA region over the 
last few years. New America Foundation provides relevant and non-partisan statistics 
used by many academics that are also studying drone warfare and will provide the 
majority of the statistical analysis for this research. This includes a public opinion poll of 
FATA residents about political issues relative to U.S. operations in the region. New 
America Foundation also maintains a current data base tracking U.S. drone strikes and 




2. Type and Mode of Analysis 
This research will utilize qualitative research to determine the collateral 
psychological and political damage of drone warfare on the Pakistani people, and how to 
use these findings to improve future leveraging of drones to fight al-Qaeda and the 
Taliban.  
This process will begin with an assessment of U.S. drone warfare in the FATA 
region of Pakistan. It will review the tactical successes and failures of the program to 
determine if drone strikes are having an overall negative or positive effect on militancy in 
the region. What about drones has worked, what has not worked and what still needs to 
be studied? This area will also analyze who is being targeted and why. Do certain 
militants need to be targeted more or less aggressively? Is the intrusion into Pakistan, 
potential for collateral damage and risk to non-combatants justified?  
The emphasis will then be directed to the collateral psychological and political 
impact of drones on the Pakistani people. Do drone strikes further the radicalization, 
recruitment, and retaliation of militants, or does this strategy actually deter and even 
eliminate militancy in the region? Topics such as love of death, narcissistic rage, learned 
helplessness, and displaced aggression will be reviewed to determine their relevance 
within the Pakistani population as a result of U.S. drone strategy. Do the tactical 
successes of drone strikes outweigh the potential for negative collateral psychological or 
political factors?  
The goal of this research is to conduct an evaluation of the collateral 
psychological and political damage of drone warfare that yields policy recommendations 
for decision makers. Policy recommendations will seek to address the following 
questions: How can drone policy be changed to more effectively target militants and 
minimize the negative impact on non-combatants, or is the current policy the best 
possible use of drones? When is the appropriate time to leverage a drone strike? What is 
the optimal situation to leverage a drone strike against an appropriate target? What facts 




The ultimate output of this analysis will be policy recommendations based 
on the collateral psychological and political damage of U.S. drone warfare in Pakistan. A 
comprehensive tactical review of current drone policy, based on its strengths and 
weaknesses, will precede the psychological and political analysis to provide a solid 
foundation for evaluation. Drone technology is rapidly being utilized and improved to 
fight militants worldwide. This thesis will examine current drone strategy using a 
psychological and political framework to improve policy by determining the optimal 
situation to leverage a drone strike and improve tactics to minimize collateral damage.    
3. Policy Analysis 
a. Problem and Alternative Solutions 
Since 9/11, drone technology has been increasingly utilized by the U.S. 
military and intelligence community to target Taliban and al-Qaeda militants. Critics of 
drone policy claim that it inspires retaliation, radicalization, and recruitment of militants, 
while proponents argue that drones strikes are an ethical self-defense strategy. Using a 
psychological and political framework, this thesis will analyze current drone policy to 
determine the optimal situations of when to leverage drone strikes and how to minimize 
collateral damage. 
Following is a list of alternative solutions: 
• Continue or escalate current drone policy, without regard to collateral 
psychological and political analysis. “Kill your way to success” believing 
a successfully targeted militant, regardless of value, justifies collateral 
damage and non-combatant casualties. 
• Revise current drone policy based on psychological and political factors to 
determine when to leverage drones and how to best ensure minimal 
collateral damage and casualties. 
• Seek greater Pakistani involvement in the program to ultimately have them 
involved in targeting and operations. Some researchers have advocated the 
program being a completely Pakistani operation since the majority of 
targets are within their nation.  
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• Declassify the program so the U.S. government can be more open about 
the program in order to gain the support of the Pakistani people. The U.S. 
could then discuss the efforts they undertake to minimize collateral impact 
and make their case for targeting specific militants. 
• The U.S. could abandon the drone program all together and resort to non-
lethal measures to proactively defend its interests in the region. 
b. Tentative Solution 
The most obvious criteria to judge success would be how many civilians 
or non-combatants are killed or injured during a drone strike. How much collateral 
damage can be attributed to an individual strike? A more difficult criterion to assess may 
be why the militant was targeted. Was the militant a high-value target, and was the 
potential risk of a drone strike justified? The problem with these methods is that the U.S. 
drone warfare program is classified and officials will not officially comment on policy or 
operations. Also, the FATA region of Pakistan is dominated by the Taliban and al-Qaeda, 
accurate reporting is nearly impossible. Another area to judge existing policy is by 
looking at the violence levels of militants following a drone strike. The problem with this 
method is that many other variables may influence a militant’s desire to launch an attack.     
In light of collateral psychological and political factors that probably 
inspire retaliation, recruitment, and radicalization, U.S. drone policy should target mid- to 
high-level militants. Why put non-combatants and civilians at risk to target an easily 
replaceable militant who lacks command and control capability? Drones should remain a 
tactic in the region and not a predominate policy. Killing all militants will only go so far 
in ending violence and bringing stability to the region. Pakistani cooperation is vital to 
the long-term effectiveness of this program. Drones have a place in the proactive defense 
of the homeland, we need to determine when drones can be utilized to their maximum 
potential to ensure success and mitigate potential risk to the innocent.  
C. PARAMETERS AND LIMITATION OF THE RESEARCH 
The primary focus of this research will examine the collateral psychological and 
political impact of U.S. drone warfare in the FATA region of Pakistan, in order to 
determine if this strategy is effective in proactively defending the U.S. homeland and our 
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interests worldwide. It will conclude with recommendations to policy makers about how 
to improve this tactic as the U.S. begins to contemplate further deployment of this 
developing technology to combat emerging asymmetric militant warfare and insurgency. 
This will be a starting point from which to evaluate the impact that each drone strike has 
on the people in the affected region, including civilians, non-combatants, and the 
militants that are targeted. The research will identify the collateral psychological and 
political factors associated with drone strikes, but does not examine the legality or 
morality of such tactics. This thesis will not yield the absolute solution to how to 
effectively leverage drones against militants without inspiring further radicalization or 
recruitment that reduces the overall value of drone warfare. The intention of this research 
is to stimulate discussion about the collateral psychological and political impact that 
drones have in FATA, and the significance of these factors when homeland security 
policy-makers contemplate future drone campaigns.  
D. THESIS OVERVIEW 
This thesis will begin with a literature review of drone warfare in FATA and the 
collateral psychological and political impact it has on the region. The researcher will 
remain objective and not let existing perspectives and findings bias data collection. The 
literature review (Chapter II) will serve as an analytic tool and be the basis for future 
chapters. The purpose of this literature review will be to provide well-rounded sources of 
information to enable the researcher to begin questioning and comparing data. It will also 
provide the researcher with theoretical sampling. 
Chapter III of this thesis will address the political, social, and cultural significance 
of Pakistan, with emphasis on FATA. The research will detail the importance of 
phenomena within this region that has made it the home and training ground of 
radicalization which threatens our nation. Chapter III will also illustrate how these factors 
can be enflamed and lead to further radicalization and recruitment by militant groups due 
to drone strikes in FATA.  
Chapter IV will review the U.S. drone warfare program featuring recent 
developments. This discussion will note the conflicting findings of this research as it 
pertains to the success of the drone program in FATA. Three case studies are reviewed to 
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highlight specific incidents pertaining to the impact of drone strikes in FATA. It 
concludes with research conducted by the Pew Research Center and New America 
Foundation which further details significant drone statistics and Pakistani feeling about 
the strikes. 
Chapter V will begin with a conclusion about the impact of drone strikes on the 
people of FATA. It will specifically address the collateral psychological and political 
impact, and the relevance to homeland security. Policy recommendations will be made 
based on the findings of this research which will propose improvements to the current 
U.S. drone program. A multi-discipline working group is briefly discussed to enhance 
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II. LITERATURE REVIEW 
“Very frankly, it’s the only game in town in terms of confronting or trying to disrupt the 
al-Qaeda leadership.”1 
 
–Director of Central Intelligence Leon Panetta on drone strikes in Pakistan 
 
The use of drone aircraft by the United States government against al-Qaeda and 
Taliban forces in Pakistan’s tribal regions began in 2001, during Operation Enduring 
Freedom. American intelligence agencies consider the Pashtun tribal areas of 
northwestern Pakistan or FATA (Federally Administered Tribal Areas) as “the most 
dangerous region on earth” and one of the greatest threats to domestic security.2 Despite 
the distance of this emergent and evolving threat in FATA, it still poses a significant 
danger to U.S. interests domestically and abroad. Since 2009, the drone program has been 
used more extensively by the Obama administration. A study conducted by the New 
America Foundation claims that drone strikes in northwest Pakistan conducted from 2004 
through early 2010 killed between 830 and 1210 individuals, of whom approximately 550 
to 850 were described as militants.3 
As the frequency of drone strikes increases, scrutiny of the program has also 
grown. Many researchers claim that the attacks are unpopular in Pakistan because of 
unnecessary collateral damage and civilian casualties. A 2009 New America Foundation 
poll of FATA residents found that 48 percent felt that drone strikes largely killed civilians 
and only 16 percent felt that drones accurately target militants.4 Some scholars find that 
these factors serve as recruiting tools for extremist groups and inspire retaliatory attacks 
                                                 
1.. Noah Shachtman,”CIA Chief: Drones ‘Only Game in Town’ for Stopping al-Qaeda | Danger Room 
| Wired.com,” Danger Room, Accessed January 15, 2013, http://www.wired.com/dangerroom/2009/05/cia-
chief-drones-only-game-in-town-for-stopping-al-qaeda/. 
2. Brian Glyn Williams, “The CIA’s Covert Predator Drone War in Pakistan, 2004–2010: The History 
of an Assassination Campaign,” Studies in Conflict and Terrorism 33, no. 10 (2010): 871. 
3. Peter Bergen and Katherine Tiedeman. “The Year of the Drone An Analysis of U.S. Drone Strikes 
in Pakistan, 2004–2010,” New America Foundation - Counterterrorism. NewAmerica.Net (2010): 1, 
http://counterterrorism.newamerica.net/sites/newamerica.net/files/policydocs/bergentiedemann2.pdf. 
4.  Peter Bergen and Patrick C. Doherty, “Public Opinion in Pakistan’s Tribal Regions,” New America 
Foundation (September 28, 2010): 3. 
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against the U.S. or local governments, which further destabilize the region. Afzal finds 
that drone strikes give radicals ammunition to recruit those on the margin of becoming 
terrorists, and that the havoc that drones wreak on Pakistan, converts non-radicals. Most 
overlooked, is that drone strikes infuriate the moderate and liberal segments of Pakistani 
society that are traditionally more sympathetic to the U.S.5  Proponents state that the 
program is a necessary self-defense strategy that uses reasonable force, and attempts to 
minimize consequences to the civilian population. Brooks argues that drones kill civilians 
at no higher rate, and almost certainly at a lower rate, than most other forms of warfare. 
Drones permit far greater precision in targeting.6 Some research indicates that certain 
Pakistani groups welcome the use of drones. Taj believes the people of Waziristan are 
suffering under a brutal occupation by the Taliban and al-Qaeda and therefore welcome 
drone strikes. This is especially true considering the collateral damage resulting from the 
Pakistani military’s long-range artillery bombardment and air strikes.7   
Understanding the impact of this tactic on the people of FATA, is essential to the 
analysis of this evolving technology. A psychological and political examination of 
Pakistani society, who lives in the affected areas, will provide a better understanding of 
the effectiveness of drone warfare as a proactive homeland defense strategy. There are 
some studies which evaluate the tactical successes and failures of drone warfare. In 2010, 
New America Foundation, featuring Peter Bergen, conducted the first comprehensive 
public opinion survey covering sensitive political issues in FATA. Both New America 
Foundation and Long War Journal maintain current statistics pertaining to drone strikes. 
As will be demonstrated in this research, data emanating from this region of Pakistan can 
be easily manipulated for political gain. Most research judges drone warfare based on the 
number of killed militants versus the number of innocent civilians killed. This study will 
go beyond statistics to look at the impact on innocent civilians, non-combatants and 
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militants. Are innocent civilians and non-combatants becoming radicalized due to drone 
strikes? What causes these reactions? Who are the militants we target and does their 
value to the militant group justify such an extreme measure?  
In order to understand the people of FATA, research will include social and 
cultural background information about the people of this region. Based on their history, is 
drone warfare the correct tactic to deal with militancy? The psychological characteristics 
which develop as a result of the social and cultural norms of FATA will also be 
discussed. Specific social, cultural and psychological factors need to be considered when 
employing drones as a proactive defense tactic. Statistical analysis of drone effectiveness 
is necessary but psychological and political evaluation will provide valuable insight that 
helps win the hearts and minds of FATA communities, which will ultimately make the 
U.S. homeland safer. This research is an examination which will identify the critical 
implications of the collateral psychological and political factors within FATA that impact 
future drone warfare operations. 
A. CHALLENGES FACING PAKISTAN 
“When a child is killed in one of these villages, that village is lost for 100 years. These 
places run on revenge.”8 
–Pakistani Diplomat 
1. Background of FATA  
When discussing the evolution of FATA, Lievan finds that in the early 1900s, the 
tribes of the Pakistani frontier were considered by the British to be too heavily armed, too 
independent-minded, and too inaccessible in their steep and entangled mountains to be 
placed under regular administration (Figures 1 and 2). The British introduced a system of 
indirect rule, which was inherited by the Pakistani central government, and remains in 
effect today within the seven Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). The goal was 
to manage tribes, not govern. However, due to Taliban insurgency, this practice has 
largely collapsed. The population of FATA is overwhelmingly Pathan (Pashtun) and 
Sunni Muslim. FATA covers 10,500 square miles (Figures 1–3) and has a population of 
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over 3.5 million, with a 30 percent male literacy rate, and a three percent female literacy 
rate. These issues can be attributed to FATA’s unique government and also to its 
inaccessibility, intense conservatism and xenophobia of the people. These people do not 
want to be governed by the Pakistani state as it currently exists.9   
 
 
Figure 1.   Map of Pakistan (From Magellan Geographix, 1997) 
                                                 




Figure 2.   Map of FATA (From Long War Journal, 2010) 
Lievan identifies the very basis of the difficulty the United States, Pakistan, or 
any nation, will have when trying to formulate an effective policy to deal with FATA. 
These people have been managed, not subjugated to government, and do not want this 
tradition to change. Following Afghan jihad against the Soviets in 1979, the tribal areas 
of Pakistan became a safe haven of the Afghan mujahideen. More than 3 million Pathan 
refugees fled into Pakistan from Afghanistan.10 This influx created a radical element 
which will make change more difficult, although there is no indication of a desire for 
reform. Any type of social or military action, regardless of intent, will be subject to 
cynicism and possibly hostility due to Taliban manipulation of the population.    
Researchers Johnson and Mason find that United States policymakers have failed 
to understand the savage, cruel, and peculiar kind of mountain warfare, frequently driven 
by religious zealotry on the tribal side that is singularly unforgiving of tactical error, 
momentary inattention, or cultural ignorance in the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region. 
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In 2007, the National Intelligence Estimation (NIE) corroborated the widely held belief 
of the intelligence community that al-Qaeda (aided by the funding of Saudi Arabian 
Wahhabists) had rebuilt its command structure in the region. Recruiting and training of 
operatives for attacks on Western targets also occurs in this area. Since retreating from 
Afghanistan in 2001, the Taliban and most of its senior leadership, has found sanctuary in 
the predominantly Pashtun FATA region. It was presumed that Osama Bin Laden was 
sheltered in tribal regions of Pakistan before being killed by U.S. forces in Abbottabad in 
2011. The Taliban and Islamic extremist insurgent elements who operate on both sides of 
the border are also Pashtun. Johnson and Mason feel that the United States 
counterterrorism community has failed to appreciate this cultural dynamic. Complicating 
matters is the belief that Pakistan’s Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate has assisted the 
Taliban and extremist insurgents in using the border, in particular FATA, as a safe haven 
for conducting cross border operations. The Taliban and associated groups have regularly 
used violence against tribal Pashtun leadership to subvert traditional governance and 
spread extremism across the Pashtun belt.11 
It is believed the Pashtun moved into the Afghanistan-Pakistan border region 
1,000 years ago (Figure 3). With over 25 million members, they are one of the world’s 
largest tribal organizations. Pashtun can be placed into five major groupings consisting of 
about 350 tribes. Relationships between them dating back hundreds of years are complex 
and complicated by feuds, disputes, ancient alliances, and political marriages. The 
Waziris are considered to be the most conservative and easily angered Pashtun tribe. 
They pride themselves as never having paid taxes to a sovereign nation or having their 
veiled lands conquered.12 The Pashtun cherish their archaic tribal culture as freedom and 
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the Durand Line which the British established as the border between Pakistan and 
Afghanistan. Illiteracy and poverty are common and women no have rights in their 
society. Most children do not attend school.13  
 
 
Figure 3.   Major Ethnic Groups of Pakistan (From Pakistan Paedia, 2006) 
Johnson and Mason also find the Pashtun to be the classic insurgent group. 
Historically, the rural Pashtun have avoided subjugation and integration by larger nations. 
They quote an elderly Pashtun tribesman as saying, “We are content with discord, we are 
content with alarms, we are content with blood…we will never be content with a master.” 
Pashtun identify with family ties and commitments. Any nationalistic emotions are 
filtered through these relationships, which consist of family, extended family, tribes, and 
clans. Bonds get more intense as the group gets smaller. In times of crisis, Pashtun look 
to these groups for support, rarely will they seek government assistance. Social, political 
and economic needs are contained within these groups, which keeps government 
institutions from gaining a foothold. This is a key reason why no foreign entity has ever 
reconciled the Pashtun under external rule.14  
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Pashtunwali, literally translated, means ways of the Pashtun, is the keystone to 
Pashtun identity and social culture from birth to death. A Pashtun adheres to Pashtunwali 
to maintain his identity and honor. Despite Pashtunwali being profoundly at odds with 
Western values, Johnson and Mason stress it is crucial for U.S. policymakers to 
understand its core principles to address the challenges of Pashtun society. Pashtunwali is 
the dominant force in tribal regions and Pashtuns accept no other law but their own. It 
imposes strict obligations on the Pashtun people based on freedom, honor, revenge and 
chivalry. The Pashtun have no interest on a new alien system being imposed on them by 
outsiders like the United States.15 
Johnson and Mason have illustrated multiple reasons for the difficulty the United 
States, or any nation, has had in trying to effect foreign policy or assistance in this region. 
Despite the best of intentions, Pashtunwali is not accepting of outside intervention. The 
Pashtun people prefer their system over Western values. Considering Pashtunwali, 
military action and foreign policy initiatives aimed at FATA are very complicated and the 
United States must fully comprehend Pashtunwali in order to effectively operate in the 
region. This is especially true considering the strong influence of the Taliban and the 
influx of Islamist extremists, both of whom are predominantly Pashtun. Pashtunwali 
values such as freedom, honor and revenge may not be accepting of military tactics by an 
outsider, especially considering the potential for collateral damage and civilian casualties. 
Even what the United States considers a successful operation, may do damage to tribal 
affairs that ultimately enrages Pashtuns who must act against the foreign oppressor 
because to regain honor and achieve revenge. Unfortunately, the United States may have 
to proactively intervene in Pakistan if the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate 
(Pakistani Intelligence) has aided extremists who operate in FATA and seek to attack the 
homeland and our interests abroad. 
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a. Education and Radicalization 
Johnson describes how militant groups have seized upon a deprived 
population and used them to further their operations in Afghanistan. Lack of control and 
oversight by Pakistani authorities in FATA has opened the door to exploitation by radical 
elements. Madrassahs assist in further radicalization of the young population that lacks 
education and jobs. During the 1980s, millions of Pashtun Afghans fled to Pakistan to 
escape the atrocities of the Soviet military campaigns. Most of these refugees settled in 
the camps that had sprung up in the border area provinces. These camps, which represent 
over 40 percent of the estimated Afghan population in Pakistan and the thousands of 
madrassahs located in the FATA, have offered the Taliban an almost infinite supply of 
recruits. Many poorly educated, unemployed Afghan youth, who have grown up in the 
border region’s refugee camps, have gravitated to the militant madrassahs. Hundreds of 
these madrassahs basically function as radicalization academies that eventually feed 
recruits to Taliban commanders.16 It appears that Pakistan’s use of militants in 
furtherance of foreign policy has grown out of their control, and circumvented the normal 
evolution of Pashtun tribal leadership. Considering the number of militant groups 
operating in and around FATA, this problem will not go away without external pressure. 
The United States doesn’t have a choice but to remain engaged in the area to protect 
assets in Afghanistan and to prevent threats developed in FATA from being a reality in 
the homeland. Until Pakistan is willing and able to effectively deal with the militancy in 
FATA that it created, and prevent militancy from posing a threat outside of the region, 
the U.S. needs to able to decisively and proactively act in self-defense.  
Fair’s research in 2008, studied the families of 141 slain militants in 
Pakistan. She contradicts Johnson’s findings by stating the majority of literature suggests 
that Pakistan’s militants are not overwhelmingly poor or uneducated, and questions the 
role of madrassahs as the means of indoctrination and radicalization. While madrassahs 
may play a valuable role in recruiting suicide and sectarian terrorists, Fair underscores the 
role of family, friends, mosque and public schools in militant development. Post 9/11 
                                                 
16. Johnson, “On the Edge of the Big Muddy: The Taliban Resurgence in Afghanistan,” 112. 
 20 
policy agendas endorsed social aid and education as the way to curb terrorism but there 
was little evidence to support these views according to Fair. She finds that militants are 
well educated by Pakistani standards, with about one quarter of those surveyed spending 
time in madrassah. Considering the education level, Fair found high unemployment 
levels which were most disturbing to her. This research also found the importance of 
household dynamics and how the input of family members weighs on the decision to 
pursue radicalization.17 Lieven supports Fair’s view on the role of madrassahs by noting 
that the majority of Pakistani terrorists have attended government schools and quite often 
have a degree of higher education which reflects the basis for Islamism in the urban 
lower middle classes rather than the impoverished masses. While a number of Taliban 
fighters have madrassah educations, this is due to the lack of government schools in the 
tribal regions. These communities would support the Taliban with or without madrassahs. 
Concentrating on the role of madrassahs is a mistake of Western policy makers. It reflects 
the tendency to look at Islamist groups and their strategies as instruments which can be 
isolated and eliminated as opposed to a deep rooted phenomenon of Islamic society.18  
The contradictions that Fair and Lieven discuss show the need for further 
study into the role of the madrassah in the recruitment and radicalization of militants in 
FATA. While madrassahs are present in the region and a part of Islamic culture, there 
does not seem to be consensus on their legitimacy in educating and developing Islamic 
youth. Before we make negative assumptions about education in a region lacking in 
academic opportunity, we must be sure of the value of madrassah and how it impacts 
FATA communities. This is especially true in this study, considering the potential for 
drone warfare instigating more recruitment and radicalization within FATA. Madrassahs 
may be the beneficiaries of an enraged population, who seek a more militant and 
religious education as a result of drone attacks. 
In 2004, Fair concluded that the on-going conflict with India over Kashmir 
was the main motivator for Pakistanis to join militant organizations, but noted indications 
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that anti-American sentiment may soon be pervasive. These Kashmir-centric groups are 
allowed to operate with immunity and impunity from the Pakistani government. Most of 
their efforts are leveraged in India-controlled Kashmir or India proper, and have received 
the support of the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (Pakistani Intelligence), and 
Pakistani military. Prior to 9/11, many in Pakistan had grown weary of the government’s 
support of al-Qaeda and the Taliban because of the damage done to civil society. After 
9/11, the Pakistanis publicly committed to the war on terror, but critics feel they were 
successful only to the degree they enforced their own counter militancy policy. Militant 
groups are utilized in a reserve capacity for covert use by the Pakistani government to 
bolster the military and support foreign policy. Pakistan still maintains relations with 
these militant groups, but does so covertly to avoid response from the U.S., India, or 
other nations. Rising antagonism toward the United States, manipulated by radical 
elements, has resulted in more opportunity for Imams to recruit for madrassahs, and to 
then select indoctrinated youth for military training. Recruiting is conducted by al-Qaeda 
informally, through relationships with local groups, and not through a broad and explicit 
infrastructure. Few in Pakistan believe that the recruitment and training could continue 
without the passive and active support of Pakistani intelligence and military 
communities.19   
Expanding on Pakistan’s India-centric military, Singh believes this 
practice has further destabilized the nation. She notes the use of insurgent and terrorist 
groups by Pakistan in the Mumbai attacks in 2008. The Inter-Services Intelligence 
Directorate (Pakistani Intelligence) has been accused for years of playing a “double 
game” by acting as a front-line U.S. ally in the fight against terror, while supporting 
selected terrorist groups.20 According to Singh, Pakistan continues to prioritize spending 
on its conventional military, rather than economic development and social services. It is 
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estimated that at least 70 percent of Pakistan’s military is on the Indian border, which 
leaves counter-insurgency operations understaffed with emphasis on ineffective ground 
operations and airstrikes.21  
Ultimately, it is Pakistan’s choice to determine their national security 
threats, and how to mitigate these vulnerabilities. The United States, or any nation, will 
have great difficulty in attempting to persuade Pakistan to re-focus on militancy within its 
borders. This is especially true considering the role the military and intelligence 
communities have played in supporting and utilizing radicals to further Pakistan’s foreign 
policy agenda. Without the committed support of Pakistan, the U.S. will not be able solve 
Pakistan’s domestic problems which have become an international threat.  
b. The Accidental Guerilla in FATA 
Kilcullen describes the Accidental Guerilla Syndrome as occurring when 
al-Qaeda moves into remote areas, creates alliances with local traditional communities, 
exports violence that prompts a Western intervention, and then exploits the backlash 
against that intervention in order to generate support for its takfiri agenda. Kilcullen uses 
the term Takfiri terrorist to define those who use terrorism to advance their ideology. al-
Qaeda gains the majority of its support from backlash rather than general popular 
support. Takfiri groups opportunistically exploit existing breakdowns in rule of law, poor 
governance, or pre-existing conflict. The terrorist infection is a part of a broader societal 
breakdown, state weakness, and humanitarian crisis. Takfiri groups may also seek an 
agreement or loose pact with the government like al-Qaeda did with Pakistan in the 
1980s. These groups will also establish training camps, indoctrination centers and 
recruiting bases in furtherance of their ideology. Takfiri groups integrate into the 
community through a combination of cooptation and violence. They marry into tribes, 
arbitrate local disputes, and put money into the local economy. Those who oppose takfiri 
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efforts may be bribed or murdered. Inevitably the takfiri group grows from a regional 
influence to a national issue and then begins to impact surrounding nations.22  
As the takfiri movement grows, external forces begin to take action 
against the extremist presence. This can include local action by the national government, 
regional action by neighboring states, or a wider global response. There are many forms 
of intervention available, choosing the right method which minimizes local backlash is 
critical. During this intervention phase, the presence of outsiders causes the local groups 
to fuse together, closing ranks against the external threat. During high-profile, violent, or 
foreign based intervention, it can increase local support for takfiri terrorists who portray 
themselves as defenders of the people against outside influence. The outsiders’ 
intervention can cause grievances, alienation, and a desire for revenge when local people 
are killed or dishonored. Local people in tribal societies will always side with the closer, 
rather than the more distant relatives, external actors, and with similar religious groups 
rather than different faiths. Local populations become accidental guerillas when they 
fight with extremist forces not in support of takfiri beliefs, but also because they oppose 
outside intervention in their affairs when they rally in support of their tribal interests, or 
the heavy-handed tactics of the outside forces. The more similar the takfiri group makes 
itself to the local population, and the more it portrays itself as the defender of the local 
population, the stronger the extremist group becomes.23   
Kilccullen finds that very few fighters take part in violence for religious or 
political reasons, let alone because of takfiri ideology. Apart from a tiny minority of 
extremists, most fighters (around 70 percent, based on motivation surveys) participated in 
violence defensively, out of a sense of threat, and because they had no alternative but to 
fight to the death to protect their communities in a terrifying and brutal environment.24 
Effective counterinsurgency is based on securing the people. Population centers need to 
be secured 24 hours a day, otherwise takfiri elements will continually infiltrate the area 
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and co-opt, or intimidate, the local population. The population cannot be won over until it 
knows that they are consistently protected from the enemy.25 In counterinsurgency, the 
population is the prize. Protecting and controlling it are the key activity.26  
2. Pakistani Military and Intelligence  
The Project Pakistan Report notes the significance that the Pakistani Army 
continues to be a dominant political actor in the creation of defense policy and has a 
decisive say in foreign policy and internal affairs. Frequent Pakistani military 
interventions have left democracy weak and government institutions subject to 
manipulation by the Army and intelligence organizations. This report finds that the Army 
has used terrorist tactics against India, and continues to strategically nurture radical 
groups within Pakistan. These relationships have also allowed for the military to be 
influenced by the jihadi doctrine of those they train and help organize. The Army enjoys 
economic status and entrenched political interest which helps keep it relevant and give it 
authority.27 
In April of 2011, President Obama highlighted the ineffectiveness of the Pakistani 
military in FATA to keep insurgents from returning to areas that had been cleared of 
militants. While the military has been successful in clearing and holding the areas of 
militants, its counterinsurgency policy that deals with rehabilitation and de-radicalizing 
has failed. Much of this stems from the fact that local authorities are hesitant to cooperate 
with the Army, because they fear retaliation and retribution from the Taliban once the 
Army leaves. Basically, the Army lacks resources and capacity to conduct hold and build 
operations in the areas cleared of militants. The problems of the Pakistan include: 
delineating between “good” and “bad” militants, weakening militants by dividing them, 
choosing not to fight militancy at the ideological level, and believing that certain militant 
groups may have a tactical or operational value. It appears that Pakistani authorities, both 
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civilian and military, have yet to develop a clearly identified strategy for dealing with 
insurgency in FATA.28 There seems to be little motivation for Pakistan to eliminate the 
“good” militants because Pakistan believes they may have a use for them despite the 
damage and instability they cause within their borders.  
Fair finds varying support for militancy in the Pakistani military, intelligence 
community, and public. As a result, Pakistan will probably be unwilling to surrender the 
use of militancy as a means of foreign policy and deal with this emerging threat to the 
region and Pakistan. The Army and intelligence agencies segment militants into groups 
over which they maintain varying degrees of control. There are indications that Pakistan 
may not be able to degrade or eliminate some groups that now target the state. Fair traces 
the Pakistani use of irregular warfare back to 1947 when Pakistan became an independent 
state. After the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979, Pakistan again used Islamist 
militants as a tool of foreign policy. The mujahideen was created by Pakistan, the United 
States, Saudi Arabia, and others, as a massive, Pakistan-based, anti-Soviet jihad. Most 
recently, nuclear proliferation by both Pakistan and India has seemed to encourage the 
use of asymmetrical tactics by Pakistan against India.29 Johnson and Mason find that 
successive Pakistani governments have promoted Islamic radicalism to curb Pashtun and 
Baluch nationalistic movements and provide “strategic depth” in Afghanistan in the event 
of a conflict with India.30 
The research of Fair and the Project Pakistan Report shows the inability and 
apparent unwillingness of Pakistani authorities to deal with insurgency in their nation, 
which will inevitably pose a threat to the United States. Fair’s research demonstrates that 
Pakistan has extensively used militancy and insurgency to further its foreign policy 
throughout their existence. She suggests that Pakistan is unwilling and in some cases 
unable to control the militant groups they have created. The Project Pakistan Report, and 
the work of Johnson and Mason, both illustrate that Pakistan is using terror tactics against 
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U.S. ally India, which creates further instability in the region. The U.S. must have a tactic 
available to protect itself and its allies until Pakistan can demonstrate that they are 
capable of securing and building areas cleared of militants. This research also shows the 
U.S. needs to maintain a proactive posture in this region to prevent developing threats 
from reaching the homeland and our vital interests abroad. It does not appear that we 
have a consistent, trusted, and valued partner in Pakistan. The U.S. must be able to 
defend itself until Pakistan is able to mitigate the threat within its borders, and stop using 
terrorist organizations to further its foreign policy. The Pakistani government may be 
content with their current relationship with militant groups, and willing to accept some 
terrorist attacks domestically. As long as Pakistan occasionally gives the U.S. the 
appearance of trying to control militant groups within its borders, Pakistan keeps a 
valuable ally for use against India, and maintains influence in the Afghan border region.   
Johnson stresses the importance that Pakistan has on the Afghanistan theatre of 
U.S. operations. Afghan officials in the past two years have made progressively stronger 
comments linking Pakistan to the Taliban insurgency by claiming that Pakistan provides 
a reliable, safe, and fertile recruiting, training, and fund-raising haven just across the 
border. FATA has among the highest rates of illiteracy, violence and poverty in Pakistan 
and yet receives little aid from Islamabad. These conditions have helped breed extremism 
in the region. FATA has never been “federally administered,” as it has always been 
dominated by Pashtun tribes. The lack of federal control and sense of lawlessness has 
made it easier for the Taliban and al-Qaeda to exploit. With high unemployment rates and 
under-developed infrastructure, drug smuggling and weapons trafficking are common. 
FATA is also home to thousands of militant madrassas that provide an unlimited supply 
of young radicalized recruits to Taliban commanders.31 
During the Afghan’s anti-Soviet jihad of the late 1970s and early 1980s, the 
Pakistani government deconstructed tribal leadership in FATA in order to promote 
radical Islamist mullahs who could promote and recruit for the Afghan mujahideen. 
While many Pashtun supported their Afghan brothers in their fight against the Soviet 
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occupier, it also permanently radicalized FATA and opened the door for other jihadi 
radicals such as Osama bin Laden. The momentum of radicalization, the failure to restrict 
the Taliban, and the presence of foreign jihadis in FATA has prevented the traditional 
Pashtun leadership from returning to power once the Soviets were defeated.32  
Currently, it is estimated there are 150 militant groups operating around FATA, 
with 116 based in FATA operating under Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan.33 Led by Baitullah 
Mesud, a Taliban commander from South Waziristan, Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan 
consisted of several Pashtun militant groups that operated in the tribal areas. Originally, 
Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan functioned as a support network for the Afghan Taliban and 
al-Qaeda, but became its own actor after Pakistan and General Musharraf sided with the 
United States’ anti-terror campaign. As a result, the Pakistan Taliban remains a 
significant threat to the internal security of the nation.34 It is believed Mehsud died in a 
U.S. drone strike in August 2009.35     
B. DRONE OPERATIONS 
“A lot of people wonder whether we can keep trying to kill our way out of this problem. 
There are people who are really questioning where does all of this end?”36 
 
–Unidentified U.S. intelligence official discussing drone warfare in Pakistan 
 
1. The Case for Drone Warfare 
Drones have the extraordinary ability to travel where soldiers cannot and are 
operated remotely, far from the battlefield, which does not put pilots in jeopardy. 
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According to former officials and sources familiar with drone technology, CIA strikes are 
directed from agency headquarters in suburban Washington, DC. Drone operators have 
immediate, easy access to sources of information from across the intelligence community 
and the military. Drones can loiter over their target for hours, using cameras and 
sometimes voice-recognition software, to identify targets. In some cases, drone operators 
have more information at their disposal than ground troops. According to a former CIA 
official who worked on the program, the CIA assesses each target and calculates 
collateral damage before any strike. Another source familiar with the technology, said 
that operators have the benefit of multiple feeds, from live video to sensor reports, as well 
as visual contacts in areas where U.S. or allied forces are on the ground.37 
Harris identifies the tactical advantage drones provide to the intelligence 
community and the U.S. military. Drones offer lethal force that is far more precise than 
traditional bombing campaigns of the past. U.S. lives are not jeopardized conducting 
drone operations and drones provide the opportunity to access the most remote regions of 
FATA. Harris also details the great lengths the CIA goes to in order to minimize 
collateral damage. Drones combined with various audio and visual sensors, and 
connectivity with ground forces, further enhance the accuracy and efficiency of the 
program.   
In May of 2009, CIA Director Leon Panetta stated that the drone campaign is “the 
only game in town” to disrupt or confront al-Qaeda leadership in Pakistan.38 Considering 
the Pakistani’s inability to deal with militants in their country, and the danger they 
present to the U.S., I would concur with Panetta’s statement. Williams continues to make 
a compelling case for drone strikes by stating the operational and logistical impact drone 
strikes have had on the militants in Pakistan. Of particular note was Williams’ belief that 
senior militants were being replaced with inexperienced mid-level leaders. I agree with 
the short-term effects of drone strikes but I question how substantial these strikes are 
beyond the elimination of the targeted individual. How valuable are the targeted 
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individuals if they are easily replaced? More research needs to be conducted on the 
targets of drones to determine if they need to be lethally targeted. This is probably not 
realistic considering the covert nature of the program and the propaganda of al-Qaeda, the 
Taliban and the Pakistani government.  
C. Christine Fair, an Assistant Professor in Georgetown University’s Security 
Studies Program, wrote that drawing the conclusion that drone strikes produce more 
terrorists than they eliminate, would be a good argument if the data from which this 
conclusion was drawn were not bogus. She states the only publicly available data on 
drone attacks in Pakistan comes from the Pakistani Taliban via the Pakistani press and 
that “high-level Pakistani officials have conceded to me that very few civilians have been 
killed by drones, and their innocence is often debatable.”39 Opponents to drone warfare 
also conflate drone strikes in Pakistan with air strikes in Afghanistan, which lumps 
together two very different theatres of operation.40 Fair makes a great point about the 
source of information in this remote and volatile region. Accurate and credible reporting 
from this region has the potential to be flawed, and future research of this topic needs to 
be cognizant of this. Priest and Arkin further discuss the Pakistani government in their 
book, “Top Secret America: The Rise of the New American Security State.”  They find 
that the Pakistani government publicly criticizes drones, but it is merely domestic 
posturing to hide their collusion with the U.S. This position is then bolstered by recent 
examples of this behavior by Pakistani officials.41 I agree with Priest and Arkin’s 
position, especially after the examples they provide of Pakistani and American officials 
seeming acceptance of this relationship. It may be a short term agreement that does 
nothing to truly solve the issues that plague this region. 
Zelin finds that drone strikes have eliminated many top al-Qaeda and Taliban 
leaders, and killed hundreds of mid-level fighters. The losses have caused these militant 
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groups to bolster their operational security which has resulted in al-Qaeda’s ability to 
operate in Pakistan being severely degraded. Zelin concludes that frequent drone strikes 
in northwest Pakistan have degraded al-Qaeda’s ability to properly train militants. Prior 
to drone warfare, al-Qaeda could spend a month or more training an operative in bomb 
making. Currently, such training lasts as little as a few days and may have a direct impact 
on al-Qaeda operations. As an example, Faisal Shahzad, the failed Times Square bomber 
of 2010, only received five days of training from TTP in the tribal areas. Shahzad’s plot 
was thwarted when he was spotted acting suspiciously and his bomb malfunctioned. If 
Shahzad had been properly trained, he may have successfully detonated his device in a 
crowded and busy Times Square. Interestingly, Shahzad claimed that increased drone 
strikes in the tribal areas were a motivating factor to him. Zelin also found that al-Qaeda 
leader Ilyas Kashmiri was also reportedly frustrated over the drone strikes in the tribal 
areas, leading him to plan an attack on the CEO of Lockheed Martin that was never 
carried out.42 
Zelin identifies multiple reasons for supporting the use of drones including the 
elimination of top militant leaders and mid-level fighters. The loss of these militants will 
have an operational impact but the effect is multiplied because these groups are now 
diverting resources to their own security instead of planning future attacks. The Shahzad 
case is an example of the positive effect of drones being utilized as a proactive self-
defense tactic because it can be argued that it has diminished the training capacity of al-
Qaeda which inevitable reduces the vulnerability of the homeland. While Shazad claims 
he was motivated by drone attacks, other factors may have contributed to his attempted 
bombing of Times Square. We should be cautious about blaming drones for increased 
terrorist attacks, domestically and abroad, due to intervening variables influencing 
behavior, even after a direct statement from the attacker.  
Williams is one of the few researchers who contend that Pakistani tribesmen in 
FATA have accepted drone strikes against the Taliban. Local tribesmen claim to have 
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been terrorized and misruled by the Taliban in recent years. Referencing the Pakistani 
newspaper “News,” Williams finds that hatred of the Pakistani Taliban is at an all-time 
high and so is disappointment about the ability of the Pakistani army to stop the 
Taliban.43 These findings would contradict the beliefs of many scholars who believe that 
drone strikes serve as a recruiting tool for radicals and inspire retaliation against the U.S. 
or local government. In “The Year of Drone Misinformation,” Farhat Taj also challenges 
the widely held belief of the research community that drone strikes are unpopular and the 
source of mass casualties. Taj, a researcher from the University of Oslo and Aryana 
Institute for Regional Research and Advocacy in Pakistan, is a native of the Afghanistan–
Pakistan border and has lived there most of her life. Taj respectfully questions the leading 
think tanks from the West that conclude drone strikes are unpopular and the statistics they 
use to support their arguments.44 Taj’s argument was solid and well put together. Overall 
very believable but there is not much support coming from Western scholars. I believe 
there is more support for this position, and it should be utilized to further support Taj’s 
claims.  
2. The Case Against Drone Warfare 
University of Arizona researchers Hudson, Owens, and Flannes state there are 
five distinct, yet overlapping, forms of blowback from the use of drones in counter-terror 
operations: the purposeful retaliation against the United States, the creation of new 
insurgents, complications in the Afghan-Pakistan theatre, further destabilization of 
Pakistan and the deterioration of U.S. and Pakistani relations.45 The authors, who are 
members of the Southwest Initiative for the Study of Middle East Conflicts (SISMEC), 
capture the main arguments against drone warfare. Most of the literature I reviewed 
seems to fall into one of the five categories listed above. There is an abundance of 
scholarly sources which support the findings of these researchers. Definitive statistical 
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support of the negative aspects of drone warfare is difficult to assess due to intervening 
factors in this volatile region. Many factors can influence the criteria established by 
Hudson, Owens, and Flannes. 
In his discussion about the history of the CIA’s covert drone warfare program, 
University of Massachusetts—Dartmouth history faculty member Brian Glyn Williams 
adds to the case against drone warfare. He finds the collateral damage of drone strikes 
gives the media and religious leaders an opportunity to rally anti-American sentiment in 
Pakistan and the Islamic world in general.46 This article highlights the ability of radicals 
to easily use drone strikes, regardless if successful or not, to their advantage to 
manipulate the views of the local population. This view was supported by multiple other 
materials I reviewed. Writing for the German based Institute for the Study of Labor 
(IZA), Jaeger and Siddique discuss an example of retaliation by the Taliban which is 
attributed to drone strikes.47 This is typical of many examples of the Taliban or al-Qaeda 
directly stating their attack against the local government or U.S. was in response to drone 
policy in the region. 
In his Georgetown University Master’s thesis, Luke Olney evaluates the long-
term effectiveness of drone warfare. He supports the previously mentioned findings with 
particular emphasis on drones inspiring further radicalization, increased recruitment 
opportunities and further destabilization of local governments. However, he does note 
that drones may have some short-term success in disrupting militant groups.48 This seems 
to be a reoccurring theme in much of the readings I have conducted. Most researchers 
support the short-term advantage of drone strikes because they eliminate the target but 
drones have only been used extensively over the last ten years and questions exist about 
their effectiveness over time. The elimination of the militant is positive. But at what point 
does this victory become outweighed by the long-term effects of the killing?    
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Support of the argument that drones have a negative political and diplomatic 
impact is made by Anne L. Oblinger in her 2011 Georgetown University thesis depicting 
the moral, legal, and diplomatic implications of drone warfare. Her thesis discusses the 
cultural and religious motivations behind terrorist activities which will be useful in a 
socio-cultural examination of this topic. She notes that despite their precision, drones still 
create many diplomatic hurdles for the U.S.49  This is another example of research which 
states that despite their tactical success, negative consequences still exist when leveraging 
drones.   
The majority of the literature indicates that there is a strong possibility of drone 
strikes having a negative overall influence in the FATA. Researchers from the University 
of Massachusetts, Dartmouth, Plaw, Fricker, and Williams, find that civilian casualties, 
real or perceived, will be the primary instigator. No matter how precise drone strikes are 
executed or how much technology improves, Pakistani press and society will be prone to 
believe that high percentages of civilians are being targeted. While the U.S. keeps details 
of the program somewhat secure, this practice allows the targeted groups to report the 
details of drone strikes to their advantage.50 There are numerous examples available of 
the collateral damage and devastation that drones inflict on the local community. Even if 
the strike successfully hits the intended target, statistics can be manipulated by the 
Taliban or Pakistani government.   
Investigative journalist Porter Gareth criticizes drone strikes because they are 
based on “scant evidence” in his article for The Washington Report for Middle East 
Affairs. He finds that the U.S. is targeting militant groups rather than al-Qaeda planning 
global terrorism.51 This was one of the few pieces of information which discussed who 
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was being targeted by drone strikes and I found it particularly valuable. There should be 
more such information available, or forthcoming, because who is being targeted is critical 
to evaluating drone warfare.  
Ken Dilanian, of the Los Angeles Times, finds that the U.S. drone program has 
killed dozens of al-Qaeda operatives and hundreds of low-level militants but is has also 
infuriated many Pakistanis. Some officials in the State Department and National Security 
Council say these strikes are counterproductive because they only kill easily replaceable 
militants and the civilian casualties, which the U.S. disputes, destabilize the government 
of President Asif Ali Zardari of Pakistan. The number of drone strikes has grown since 
2008 and now includes targeting of individuals based on a “pattern of life” that suggests 
involvement with insurgents. A former senior U.S. intelligence official stated that the 
CIA maintains a list of the top 20 targets and has at times had difficulty finding high-
value militants to add to the list. Are lower-level militants being targeted just to fill the 
list? This official is among those urging the CIA to reconsider its approach because the 
agency cannot kill all Islamic militants and drones alone will not solve challenge 
presented in the region. One former senior State Department official stated that drone 
strikes probably give motivation to those that fight us. Dilanian offers that it is impossible 
to independently assess the accuracy or effectiveness of the strikes because the program 
is classified, the Obama administration refuses to release information about the program 
and Pakistan has barred access to FATA from Western journalists or humanitarian 
agencies.52  
This is one of Dilanian’s many pieces documenting drone warfare in Pakistan. 
Considering the sources of information he uses for this article, it appears that many in the 
military and intelligence community are beginning to realize the potential negative 
aspects of this tactic. He also identifies why it is so difficult to accurately and 
independently report on the impact of drone strikes and how data can be easily 
manipulated by the U.S., Pakistan, and militants.  
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3. Statistical Analysis 
a. New America Foundation Database 
The New America Foundation database reflects the aggregation of 
credible news reports about U.S. drone strikes in Pakistan. The media outlets that New 
America relies upon are the three major international wire services (Associated Press, 
Reuters, Agence France Presse), the leading Pakistani newspapers (Dawn, Express 
Times, The News, The Daily Times), leading South Asian and Middle Eastern TV 
networks (Geo TV and Al Jazeera), and Western media outlets with extensive reporting 
capabilities in Pakistan (CNN, New York Times, Washington Post, LA Times, BBC, The 
Guardian, Telegraph). The New America Foundation makes no independent claims about 
the veracity of casualty reports provided by these organizations. The purpose of this 
database is to provide as much information as possible about the covert U.S. drone 
program in Pakistan. 
The Obama administration dramatically increased the frequency of the 
drone strikes, in comparison to the Bush Administration, with the peak number of drone 
attacks occurring in 2010, but the ratio of civilians killed in drone strikes fell to just over 
two percent. Despite the record 122 strikes in 2010, an average of 0.3 civilians were 
killed per strike, the lowest civilian death rate per strike until 2012, which saw only 0.1 
civilians killed per attack in the first eight months of the year. According to data collected 
as of the summer of 2011, only one out of every seven drone strikes killed a militant 
leader. Under President Bush, about one-third of the militants killed were identified as 
leaders, but under President Obama, just 13 percent have been militant leaders. Drone 
strikes dropped sharply in 2011, as the relationship between the United States and 
Pakistan deteriorated. During the first half of 2012, the rate of strikes continued to fall 
and the civilian death ratio was close to zero. Since the U.S. drone campaign in Pakistan 
began in 2004, 84 to 85 percent of those killed were reported to be militants; six to eight 
percent were reported to be civilians and seven to nine percent remain “unknown.”53 
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b. New America Foundation Public Opinion Poll 
The New America Foundation and Terror Free Tomorrow conducted the 
first comprehensive public opinion survey covering sensitive political issues in FATA. 
This survey was conducted from June 30 to July 20, 2010, and consisted of face-to-face 
interviews of 1,000 FATA residents age 18 or older across 120 villages or sampling 
points in all seven tribal Agencies of FATA. The respondents were 99 percent Pashtun, 
and 87 percent Sunni. Among their findings were that nearly nine out of ten opposed the 
U.S. following al-Qaeda and the Taliban into FATA and most would prefer that the 
Pakistani military fight these forces in FATA. Seventy-six percent are opposed to U.S. 
drone strikes, 16 percent believe they accurately target militants and just under half 
believed that drones predominantly kill civilians. The majority of FATA residents reject 
the presence of the Taliban or al-Qaeda in their region. Their top priorities included lack 
of jobs which was closely followed by lack of schools, good roads and security, poor 
health care and corruption of local official officials.54 
C. COLLATERAL PSYCHOLOGICAL AND POLITICAL DAMAGE  
“Hopelessness, deprivation, envy, and humiliation, make death and paradise seem more 
appealing.” 
–An elderly resident of Jenin55 
 
Avner uses psychoanalysis, psychology, psychiatry, sociology, anthropology, and 
Islamic studies to understand Islamic terror. His research discusses the religion and 
culture of Islam, the psychology of Islam, the Muslim family and Muslim society from 
which many terrorists originate. Avner finds that terror can originate with emotions such 
as rage, hatred, fear and surprisingly, love and longing.56  
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1. Honor and Shame 
Shame is an excessively painful feeling and is prevalent in Muslim culture. 
Shame, loss of honor, loss of face, and humiliation are unbearable feelings. Hamady 
found that shame was the worst and most painful feeling for an Arab. Preserving one’s 
honor and the honor of their tribe or clan is crucial. Any injury, real or imagined, causes 
unbearable shame that must be repaired through acts of revenge against those that 
damaged your honor.57 The importance of pride, honor and dignity is critical in Muslim 
culture. “Everything must be done to erase one’s humiliations and to regain one’s 
honor.”58  For Muslims who feel they have been shamed or humiliated, the only way to 
repair these feelings is by humiliating those that inflicted shame and humiliation on 
them.59  
Avner’s research identifies multiple psychological factors which may explain the 
existing anger within segments of the Muslim community. Honor and shame is a 
tremendous motivator in Islam and may provide a solid predisposition for action against 
the offending party to regain one’s honor. Maintaining your honor or the honor of your 
tribe is of high importance to the Pashtun tribesmen of FATA. Once this has been 
violated, retaliation is obligated against those that have humiliated you.      
Stern reveals that the real or perceived national humiliation of the Palestinian 
people by Israeli policies gives rise to desperation and uncontrollable rage. Citing Mark 
Jurgensmeyer, Stern notes that suicide bombers are attempting to “dehumiliate” the 
deeply humiliated and traumatized. Through their actions, suicide bombers belittle their 
enemies and provide themselves with a sense of power. Repeated, small humiliations add 
up to a feeling of nearly unbearable despair and frustration, which can result in atrocities 
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being committed in the belief that attacking the oppressor restores dignity.60 A skilled 
terrorist leader can strengthen and utilize feelings of betrayal and the desire for revenge.61 
Stern shows the extent to which a Muslim will go to in order to restore their honor 
after being humiliated. The uncontrollable rage may not be proportionate when measured 
by Western standards. Even small humiliations will build to the point of suicide attacks to 
repair the loss of dignity. The hopelessness and aggravation many may feel in FATA 
should not be overlooked or diminished. Charismatic militant leaders can manipulate 
shame to motivate groups to action against whom they perceive has wronged their group. 
The most important psychoanalytic idea for understanding terrorism, according to 
Avner, is Heinz Kohut’s notion of narcissistic rage, “The need for revenge, for righting a 
wrong, for undoing a hurt by whatever means, and a deeply anchored, unrelenting 
compulsion in the pursuit of all these aims, which gives no rest to those that have 
suffered a narcissistic injury. These are the characteristic features of narcissistic rage in 
all its forms and which set it apart from other kinds of aggression.” This boundless rage, 
together with unconscious factors and the traditional Muslim family dynamic may 
explain Islamic terrorism, including suicidal versions.62 Kohut’s finding that narcissistic 
rage is the most important psychoanalytic factor for understanding is significant. The 
narcissistic aspect depicts how personal the hostility is and rage shows the intensity of the 
emotion which drives terrorists. Narcissistic rage allows the militant to pursue those that 
they perceive have wronged them by using extreme measures to regain their honor. 
The fundamentalist Muslim family structure may also lay a foundation for future 
radicalization. Muslim women are often abused by males in their family, including 
fathers, brothers, or husbands.63 Wife abuse and child abuse are connected. Abused and 
traumatized wives do not make good enough mothers who can traumatize, abuse, and 
enrage their child to get back at her male abusers. This child’s rage can later be displaced 
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from their mother to their future wife or even the United States or Israel. Physical and 
mental abuse, along with shaming by the father, can also further the rage and humiliation 
suffered by Muslim children.64  Unconscious longings for the love of a mother and father 
can displace murderous rage from the parents to the perceived oppressor.65 Additionally, 
the physical and emotional abuse of the Muslim boy causes him to harbor murderous 
narcissistic rage at his parents, which seeks release through displacement.66 The 
dysfunction in some Muslim homes may develop a child who is already traumatized, 
humiliated and angry. Further exposure to honor, shame and humiliation in Islamic 
culture, as the child matures, may increase the likelihood that they will become 
radicalized. 
a. Displacement of Aggression  
Miller, Pedersen, Earleywine, and Pollock, explain the concept of 
triggered displaced aggression as an inappropriate retaliatory aggressive response to a 
provocation by an innocent that may reflect the displacement of anger from the initial 
provocateur. An example would be a man kicking his sleeping dog as he returned home 
from a bad day at work. It is noteworthy because it shows the restraint of the individual 
from the stronger initial provocation and then is exposed during the second triggering 
incident. The strength of the aggressive response exceeds the sum of both the first and 
second provoking incidents and is incommensurate with the overall level of 
provocation.67  
With regard to displacement, Moghaddam identifies displacement of 
aggression as a technique used by militant group leaders to channel aggression toward 
targets outside of their group. These outside groups are not responsible for the negative 
feelings and too weak to retaliate when attacked. The less similar the outside group, the 
                                                 
64. Avner Falk, Islamic Terror: Conscious and Unconscious Motives (Westport, CT: Praeger Security 
International, 2008), 144–146. 
65. Ibid., 153. 
66. Ibid., 169. 
67. Norman Miller, William C. Pedersen, Mitchell Earleywine, and Vicki E. Pollock, “A Theoretical 
Model of Triggered Displaced Aggression,” Personality and Social Psychology Review 7, no. 1 (2003), 75–
76. 
 40 
more likely it will be targeted through displaced aggression. Within groups, displacement 
of aggression is associated with increased cohesion, conformity, obedience and giving 
rise to a more aggressive style of leadership. By identifying an external target as a threat, 
group members are more tightly tied together inside. Displacement of aggression is a 
perpetual cycle as group leaders attempt to direct negative sentiments toward targets 
outside of the group. Freud felt that the dark side of cohesive groups was their ability to 
use displacement of aggression against dissimilar targets outside of the group.68 
The concept of triggered displaced aggression may show how honor and 
shame is utilized by radical militants in FATA, to inspire and recruit Pashtun tribesmen 
to jihad against an outgroup, such as Western nations. Anger builds in a Muslim as they 
are victimized and humiliated throughout their life. al-Qaeda or Taliban fighters appeal to 
their Pashtun Muslim brothers to fight the foreign aggressor. Although Muslim suffering 
may not be directly attributable to the U.S. or her allies, radicals can exploit a religious 
bond with the Pashtun to create a cohesive and violent ingroup.     
When dealing with group dynamics, Moghaddam states that the external 
threat leads to internal group cohesion, and enhances support for more aggressive, 
assertive leadership. There are many examples of aggressive, single-minded political 
leaders who rise to power because of an external threat but fade away when the threat 
fades or during the transition to peace. An example is U.S. president George W. Bush, 
because he was re-elected utilizing a “rally behind the leader” mentality during the post 
9/11 campaign of 2004.69 These same principles can be applied to terror groups, which 
operate in FATA. Charismatic al-Qaeda and Taliban leaders have been able to rally the 
support of local populations to oppose U.S. policy and influence. Having identified the 
U.S. and her allies as the outgroup enemy has made it easier for militants to utilize more 
aggressive tactics to free themselves of domination. The Pashtun are already opposed to 
outside intervention and their manipulation by militants gives them the ability to organize 
and fight back.  
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The Pakistani government has also utilized displaced aggression in its 
traditional focus on the threat posed by neighboring India. In this continuous struggle, the 
Pakistanis have enlisted the assistance of militant groups to stage operations in India and 
in Kashmir. The strategy of using radical groups and nurturing them as a strategic tool 
has contributed to radicalism in Pakistani society. Also, Pakistan’s India centric military 
doctrine failed to address growing militancy in FATA.70  
Jones identifies Pakistan as a key node for militant groups allied with al-
Qaeda, but not formal members. This allows groups to remain independent and pursue 
their own goals but work with al-Qaeda for specific operations or training purposes when 
necessary. This includes Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) who is largely confined to 
South Asia, but has attempted attacks in Europe and the U.S. Other Pakistan-based 
groups include Lashkar-e-Tayiba (LeT), who traditionally operates in India and Kashmir 
but has expanded interest to the West, and the Islamic Jihad Union, who has also 
conducted attacks against the West.71 Pakistan’s use of some militant groups as a tool of 
foreign policy in India and Kashmir dates back to 1947 and has contributed to the 
nation’s culture of militancy. In the 1970s, Pakistan provided modest assistance to 
Islamist militants in Afghanistan. Following the Soviet invasion, Pakistan increased these 
efforts in the 1980s. Since then, Pakistan has continued to support militant groups as a 
tool of foreign and domestic policy. Pakistan has long used Islam to strengthen its 
identity which has evolved into a strategic commitment to jihadi ideology. As late as 
mid-2011, Pakistan still supported the Afghan Taliban and other groups to balance 
India’s growing influence in Afghanistan. In India, Pakistan supported groups such as 
Lashkar-e-Tayiba to liberate India controlled Kashmir.72 
Pakistan’s constant preoccupation with India has actively or residually 
displaced aggression from India to the West as Pakistan continues to utilize militant 
groups as facilitators of foreign and domestic policy. Groups that Pakistan has allowed to 
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strategically exist for use in India, Kashmir, and Afghanistan, have opened the door for 
like-minded groups. This has resulted in further recruitment and radicalization as militant 
groups now use Pakistan as a base for training and operations in Afghanistan and against 
the West.  
2. Historical Trauma 
Wurmser finds that severe historical trauma exists in the cultural memory of a 
people, and is transmitted through generations, mostly in the form of survivor guilt and 
shame that must be expiated. He believes that these factors lead directly to the 
background of terrorism. Suicide bombers are created in a society that abuses its children 
and teaches blind obedience to authority. While the trauma is based on history, the 
culture still continually re-creates new trauma. The rage created from constant shaming is 
deflected onto an outside enemy, who has values antithetical to those the group values 
and honors. Wurmser also notes a deep sense of humiliation deficiency. 
From a psychoanalytic view, Wurmser views a shame-oriented superego, rooted 
in severe emotional or physical trauma, just as an important factor to consider as poverty, 
social injustice, or religious fanaticism. The shamed part of self is projected onto the 
victim and it needs to be tortured and destroyed as a symbol of one’s own victimhood and 
weakness. On the other side, a harsh superego projects absolute authority onto terror 
groups, their leaders and above all “God,” which leads to terrorism arising from the 
externalization of the inner conflict with the superego. This inner resentment includes 
family, group, and large community. The history of terrorism is based on resentment and 
shame, and how it is exploited for profit and power.73  
Wurmser sees religion as a promising union with an inspirational authority. It also 
provides redemption from guilt brought on by inner aggression, omnipotence of 
responsibility, and shame over one’s actual or perceived weakness. These dynamics are 
based on culture and historical resentment, which are influenced by family and 
childhood, and emerge as inner victimhood. Feelings of shame overcome guilt, and 
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external humiliations unleash strong aggression against whoever is perceived to be the 
cause of this shame. Terrorist acts, especially suicide, can be considered acts of 
redemption. A necessary part of this is the defensive dehumanization of the victim which 
will deprive them of their unique value based on factors such as race, religion or class.74 
Wurmser illustrates a cycle of trauma, guilt, humiliation, and shame that exists in 
a people and is passed by generations. The trauma is a part of their history yet each 
generation renews these feelings by creating new trauma. A society that abuses its 
children and can be rallied by strict and intolerant obedience to radical leaders, is ripe to 
be manipulated to terrorism. Using religion, Islamic leaders provide inspiration and 
redemption from the shame and humiliation one feels about their perceived weakness. 
Family and childhood resentment leads to strong aggression against whoever is thought 
to be the source of their shame which can be shaped by radical Islamic leaders. These 
cycles of trauma may make Pashtun tribesmen susceptible to radicalization efforts of 
inspirational Islamic leaders who seek to rally them against the West.  
Stern identifies how the leaders of an alienated religious group in Arkansas create 
a story about an imminent danger posed to the “in-group” which fosters their identity, 
dehumanizes the enemy and creates a “killer” mentality that is capable of murdering 
large numbers of innocent people. She finds that terrorists frequently claim to be 
protecting the in-group from impure outsiders. Using alienation and anomie, leaders can 
construct a group identity based on knowing what these lost souls need and want in their 
lives.75 Sociologists argue that the first requirement for mobilizing an oppressed group is 
the identification of a common enemy. Religion is the ideal motivator of violence 
because it gives people identity and a distinction between “them” and “us.”76 
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a. Globalization and Identity 
Globalization has made the identification of a common enemy for Muslim 
groups easier, because the threat to their identity is closer. Political, economic, social and 
psychological factors have combined to create circumstances where Muslims, especially 
fundamentalist Muslims, feel collectively threatened. This threat is distressing 
psychologically, and associated with collective feelings of shame, frustration, and 
anxiety. Looking inward, Muslims seek to create and support a society that is in harmony 
with a positive view of their lifestyle. However, Muslims must inevitably look outward 
and interact with the western world to survive, which can be hostile. At the heart of this 
deeply emotional threat to their Muslim ingroup, are Zionism and American Imperialism. 
Muslim leaders can manipulate the Israeli and American threat to eliminate democratic 
movements in Muslim society. A key facilitator of this identity crisis is the perceived 
threat of immediate aggressive military action by the U.S. and its allies to take Muslim 
territories. Additionally, the expansion of U.S. culture, values, and ideals, has been 
especially attractive to the younger generation of Muslims and another catalyst of a 
Muslim identity crisis. The threat to Muslim identity presented by globalization has also 
altered the sense of control they experience because their way of life is being threatened. 
Groups whose identity is being threatened often react irrationally and destructively. The 
need to humble and humiliate the U.S. arises from the threat to the collective Muslim 
identity and a deeper fear of becoming extinct.77  
Stern depicts the potential violence an alienated religious group can inflict 
upon its perceived outgroup. She finds religion to be the ideal motivator of people to 
violence. Dehumanization tactics are also used to legitimize the killing of large groups. 
Wurmser has demonstrated how these ingroups can be organized and Stern shows the 
danger of an ingroup who is protecting itself from the impure outgroup. Islamic leaders 
construct the ingroup based on meeting the needs of the alienated while being motivated 
based on the identification of a common enemy. Stern shows the possible level of 
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violence an alienated society such as a radicalized Pashtun will go to in order to restore 
its honor by retaliating against the outgroup which in this case would be the U.S.  
b. Relative Deprivation 
In his analysis of relative deprivation, Moghaddam discusses Runcilman’s 
research of the attitudes toward inequality by focusing on the relation between the 
inequalities of a society and the feelings of acquiescence or resentment which may occur. 
According to materialist theories, disadvantaged groups will acquiesce rather than harbor 
feelings of resentment. However, materialist theories do accept that under certain 
situations group-based inequalities do lead to feelings of resentment. Relative deprivation 
theory may play a key role in determining one outcome over another. For example, in the 
U.S. a car is a necessity, one that even the poor need to have; but in many non-Western 
societies a car is considered a luxury. Within the framework of relative deprivation, our 
sense of deprivation is relative to the societal situation and how we perceive it.78 
Citing Runciman, Moghaddam uses the term egoistic deprivation to 
describe an individual who feels “relatively deprived because of his own position as 
member of a group,” and the term fraternalistic deprivation to describe a person who 
feels “relatively deprived because of the group’s position in society.” There is evidence 
that suggests that fraternal, or group relative deprivation, is associated with participation, 
or at least support of, collective action. Additionally, there is support for the theory that 
fraternal deprivation is associated with stronger prejudices against target outgroups. 
Fraternal deprivation among Muslims in India was found to be the best predictor of 
negative attitudes toward Hindus. It can be presumed that feelings of collective 
deprivation (fraternalistic) are associated with experiences of more intense frustration, 
with the possibility of various forms of aggression against outgroups as a possible 
result.79    
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Relative deprivation is a key factor when discussing issues such as poverty 
and education in FATA. Not everyone in FATA may feel deprived, some may acquiesce 
and accept their situation. Others may feel deprived yet unwilling or unable to act against 
the outgroup. If they do act, it remains to be seen which outgroup will be the target of 
their aggression. The deprived could view the Pakistani government, America and her 
allies, or foreign militants as an outgroup and target of their aggression. 
One of the strongest claims to human social behavior is similarity 
attraction. It suggests through considerable research that people are more positively 
disposed toward people who are similar to them. With regard to immigrant receiving 
societies, similarity attraction influences the choice immigrants make when they move to 
an adopted land and also impacts the level of acceptance the adopted land makes in 
receiving the immigrant. Both the immigrant and adopted land assume mutual 
compatibility, based on personality traits and skills. The relationship between immigrant 
and adopted land will improve over time as compatibility increases. Evidence also exists 
which demonstrates that people are more positively disposed toward ingroup rather than 
outgroup members. It is easier to empathize with people who share our group 
characteristics. This model also works in the business world based on the attractiveness 
of the organization, attractiveness of the individual and increased similarity between the 
two based on socialization and conforming to norms.80 
Similarity attraction may shed light as to why Pashtun tribesmen have 
been accepting, in at least a small way, to radical Islamist mullahs that the Pakistani 
government has imposed on them. Pashtun may feel more in common with al-Qaeda and 
the Taliban than a foreign occupier such as the U.S. and its allies. It may also account for 
why FATA is not officially regulated by the Pakistani government and why the Pashtun 
resent interference from outside entities regardless if it is the U.S. or Pakistan. With no 
interaction with the U.S. in FATA, Pashtun are only exposed to the Taliban and al-Qaeda 
elements which further develops a more radicalized relationship and creates animosity 
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and hostility towards outgroups, such as the U.S. This creates the perfect opportunity for 
enhanced group cohesion among the Pashtun and militants which may also drive more 
aggressive leadership by al-Qaeda and the Taliban    
D. CONCLUSION 
The Pashtun are a society based on honor and shame. They are fiercely 
independent and have, historically, resisted subjugation and intervention throughout their 
history. It is in their nature to resist governance by the Pakistani government and to resent 
U.S. drone strikes as a violation of their sovereignty. Through Pashtunwali, they have 
accepted, or have been coerced into sheltering, radical militants who have come to FATA 
from Afghanistan or other Islamic nations to train and recruit the local population for 
jihad. Drone strikes have created more fighters willing to fight with Takfiri elements as 
the accidental guerilla syndrome plays out in FATA. Many of these militant groups 
operate with some level of support within the Pakistani government. Regardless of how 
successful U.S. drone strikes are in targeting militants, minimizing collateral damage, or 
civilian casualties, the Pashtun will see drones as humiliating and seek revenge against 
the U.S. or its allies. Militant groups aligned with the Taliban or al-Qaeda have 
manipulated these emotions to recruit and inspire further radicalization. This desire for 
revenge combined with factors such as narcissistic rage and displaced aggression creates 
a motivated threat to the U.S. domestically and abroad.    
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III. FATA AND PAKISTAN 
“Every tribesman has a blood feud with his neighbor. Every man’s hand is against the 
other, and all against the stranger.” 
 
–Winston Churchill on Pakistan’s tribal regions81 
 
A. THE REGION AND PEOPLE 
The border between Pakistan and Afghanistan is 1,640 miles long, much of which 
is so remote and mountainous it is virtually inaccessible. The Federally Administered 
Tribal Areas (FATA) of Pakistan run north to south along the northern section of the 
border and is home to 3.2 to 4.0 million people. It consists of seven provinces: North and 
South Waziristan, Kurram, Orakzai, Khyber, Mohmand, and Bajaur in the north. Since 
retreating from Afghanistan in 2001, thousands of Taliban fighters, including the entire 
intact senior leadership, have found sanctuary here. Both the fleeing Taliban and the 
residents are overwhelmingly Sunni Pashtun.82 This region serves the needs of the 
Taliban well. They have easy ingress and egress to Afghanistan among their Pashtun 
brothers. The remoteness of the region makes it the ideal place to carryout insurgency 
operations in either country. 
Traditionally, FATA has been considered a loose political system of tribal 
autonomy with Islamabad having no legal jurisdiction beyond 100 meters to the right and 
left of the few paved roads which exist in the tribal regions. However, the Pakistani 
government has subverted Pashtun leadership in FATA and utilized extremists to take 
control over the districts since the early 1970s. This practice dramatically increased 
during the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan in 1979. The Pashtun have demonstrated to be 
susceptible to religious insurgencies while resisting external government control. 
Unfortunately since 2001, international efforts in the region have featured the central 
Pakistani government intervening which is precisely the wrong strategy to employ here. 
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Insurgency is the Pashtun answer to government intrusion. Over millennia, legal codes, 
forms of governance, and conflict resolution strategy, have been developed in FATA. 
The Pashtun prefer their own methods over alien external ones. Despite poverty, 
unemployment, illiteracy, maternal and infant mortality, and human longevity rates near 
the worst in the world, when not under external pressure, most Pashtun are peaceful 
subsistence farmers. Revolution in these areas is more about culture and religion, not 
economic factors.83 
Since 2001, the Taliban has targeted Waziri tribal leaders who resisted Taliban 
domination through assassination and intimidation. Between 2005 and 2006, over 200 
tribal elders were murdered by Taliban agents in FATA. Further “Talibanization” of 
FATA has included the targeting of video stores, girls’ schools and other locations judged 
to immoral. Extremists are also promoting radical ideologies and challenges to 
government authority. With the collaboration of the Inter-Services Intelligence 
Directorate (Pakistani Intelligence), FATA has become a base of command and control, 
fundraising, recruiting, training, and insurgency operations in Afghanistan, for militant 
groups such as the Taliban.84  
Since the 1970s, the use of militants in FATA by the Pakistani government has 
provided a foundation of militancy that exists today. Taliban leaders have been able to 
reside in FATA because of their Pashtun heritage, and the Pashtun resentment of outside 
interference. The intrusion of the central Pakistani government and western nations 
engaged in the war on terror has driven the Taliban and FATA society together. Even 
peaceful farmers would most likely side with the Taliban over the Pakistani military or 
Western forces. If for no other reason than fear of Taliban reprisal, most Pashtun have 
aligned themselves with the militants who inhabit FATA.  
Pashtunwali demands that a man have an exaggerated sense of personal honor. 
Justice is wrapped in a Pashtun’s maintenance of honor and independence from external 
authority. Action must be taken to regain honor, even if it breaks state laws. It may take 
generations to avenge the wrong but retribution will be the focus of the family’s life until 
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honor is regained. Pashtunwali creates a conservative social dynamic in which large-scale 
warfare and social change only occur under religious leadership such as a charismatic 
mullah like the Taliban’s Mullah Omar. It also dictates hospitality, protection and refuge 
to all who require it. This applies to anyone coming to their home including strangers. 
The provider must give shelter, food, drink, clothing and protection to the seeker even at 
the cost of their own life. This may explain the acceptance of the Taliban and why bin 
Laden was found in Pakistan. Freedom, honor, revenge and chivalry have defeated every 
effort to subjugate the Pashtun with a codified and centralized rule of law. The West 
continues to ignore Pashtunwali, while the Taliban and al-Qaeda use it for recruitment, 
shelter, and radicalization.85 
In FATA, the Pashtunwali traditions of revolt and war are stronger than in other 
areas of the country, and encompass outside invasion and government in general. There is 
also more emphasis on the greater role of religion and the tribal nature in FATA than in 
other regions. These beliefs form clan solidarity and collective revenge.86 Pashtunwali 
gives militant groups such as al-Qaeda and the Taliban fertile recruiting grounds and the 
opportunity to expand operations and training in FATA. Pashtun society is very much 
driven by honor, revenge and resentment of outsiders. Militant organizations, with 
varying levels of support from Pakistani authorities, have been able to leverage enough 
support of the Pashtun to continue to thrive in this region.    
1. Home of the Accidental Guerilla 
“The FATA, indeed, is the ancestral home of the accidental guerilla and the place 
where the syndrome is visible in its purest and most classic form.”87 al-Qaeda’s presence 
in the region dates back about 30 years, with the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, which 
drew up to 25,000 Arabs to fight with the mujahideen. The Arab takfiri presence in 
FATA has been nearly constant since then. During the same time period, the Taliban, 
which originated in refugee camps in or near FATA, grew through tribal connections and 
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the support of the Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (Pakistani intelligence service) 
and established a strong presence in the same areas. This led to foreign takfiri elements 
such as Chechens, Uzbeks, and Uighurs, burrowing into FATA society, which damaged 
the structure of the tribes which were already weakened by war and population 
movement. These extremists co-opted some members of the local community through 
guest status of Pashtunwali and religious identity and intimidated others while creating a 
safe haven for their activities. Religious leaders are able to exploit the external threat to 
assume greater leadership roles and political prominence which allows them to 
circumvent tribal rule and government authority.88 The West, led by the U.S., has urged 
the Pakistani government to take action in FATA. In some ways, Pakistani efforts to 
control or eliminate militancy has increased and spread the influence of the Taliban and 
al-Qaeda.89  
Traditional approaches in counterinsurgency are enemy focused, aimed at hunting 
and killing key enemy personnel. Protecting and winning over the population are 
secondary which is a key reason why the Pakistani army has done so poorly against 
insurgents. Population centered counterinsurgency operations produce results quicker and 
are more effective than targeting insurgents directly.90 Population centric approaches 
gain the trust and support of local people by protecting them not just killing insurgents. 
This does not always mean less fighting, in the short-term it may mean more as security 
forces struggle to gain influence from militants at the grass root level. Directly targeting 
the enemy will marginalize them but providing security and order will re-create the 
necessary leverage to stabilize the region.91 In counterinsurgency terms, clearing an 
enemy safe haven does not mean destroying the enemy in it. Destroying the enemy is 
strictly secondary, if necessary at all. What is important, is rescuing the civilian 
population from enemy control and intimidation. It may be possible to reconcile the 
accidental guerilla from insurgency as opposed to the irreconcilable extremists. In Iraq, 
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Kilcullen references insurgency operations lifting the fear from populations that terrorists 
had intimidated and exploited in order to win them over and work with them to clear out 
remaining cells.92  
B. PAKISTAN AND RADICALIZATION 
“It is the headquarters of al-Qaeda senior leadership”93 
 
–General David Petraeus on Pakistan’s border region 
 
Pakistan’s rivalry and insecurity with its neighbors Afghanistan and India, explain 
why Pakistan has made a strong military a priority over democratic institutions and the 
pursuit of socio-economic development. There is also a heavy Saudi and Wahhabi 
influence to counter the influence of Shiite Iran. The invasions of Afghanistan, first by 
the Soviets in 1979, and then by U.S.-led forces in 2001, were major entry points for 
militancy with a high involvement of foreign intervention and impact. During the late 
1970s, Pakistan, the U.S., and Saudi Arabia, supported the Afghan mujahedeen with 
money, training, and manpower. Pakistan also provided a training ground and was a 
central arena for militant religio-political movements, local insurgent groups, proxy 
movements and other ideological organizations on the behalf of Afghanistan. During the 
1980s, the Afghanistan-Pakistan border was a hub for foreign militants who wanted to 
contribute to Afghan jihad or organizing jihad in their own country.94   
The invasion of Afghanistan by U.S.-led forces in 2001 put Pakistan between its 
two historic allies, the U.S. and the Afghan Taliban. Pakistan’s solution has been to play 
a double game that publicly supports the U.S. and covertly backing the Afghan Taliban. 
At the same time, Pakistan became the target of Taliban factions such Tehreek-e-Taliban 
Pakistan (TTP), which accused Pakistan of betraying its historic alliance with the Afghan 
Taliban and siding with invading forces. After the invasion began, thousands of Afghan 
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Taliban, al-Qaeda members escaped to Pakistan looking for refuge, where they continue 
the fight in Afghanistan. This included foreign affiliates of al-Qaeda consisting of 
Uzbeks, Chechens, and Tajiks. These groups gradually settled in FATA.95   
Pakistan has a long history of using Islamist militants as proxies. The scale, scope 
and territorial range of such jihad expanded in the late 1980s, when Pakistan became an 
overt nuclear power. Some within the Pakistani government believed that this strategy 
would cause India, also a nuclear power, to act cautiously in responding to militant 
attacks in disputed Kashmir. Pakistan exemplified the “stability-instability paradox” by 
believing nuclear weapons decreased the possibility of nuclear war between nuclear 
states such as India and Pakistan, but at the same time increases the possibility of minor 
or limited war. With the development of covert, and then overt, nuclear capabilities, 
Pakistan could support militant groups with limited fear of retaliation.96 
Fear of India, especially a nuclear India, has been the driving force behind 
Pakistan’s pursuit of nuclear weapons. The “Islamic Bomb” reflects Pakistan’s pride in 
their role as the leading Muslim country when dealing with other Muslim countries over 
nuclear issues. Wikileaks documents the chief concern of U.S. diplomats as being the 
potential for terrorist sympathizers to get control of radioactive materials to be used as a 
dirty bomb.97  
Prior to 9/11, Pakistan’s militant groups could be grouped according to sect, 
theatre of operations or ethnicity. There were militant groups that traditionally focused on 
Kashmir but in recent years their operations have extended beyond Kashmir. This 
includes Lashkar-e-Tayiba (LeT) and various Deobandi groups (revivalist Sunni 
Islamists) that have moved into India and continue operations in Pakistan. Some target 
U.S., NATO and Afghan forces in Afghanistan.98  This expansion demonstrates the 
problem that Pakistan has created for the U.S. as Kashmiri groups now pose a threat to 
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the U.S. These groups were created, or allowed to exist, because of the dispute over 
Kashmir and the continuation of an India-centric military focus. Pakistan continues to 
further foreign policy and military objectives by utilizing some militant groups that 
destabilize the region. 
There are now indications that Pakistani intelligence officers and the military are 
afraid of the creature they helped create in Lashkar-e-Tayiba. They acknowledge possible 
sympathizers within their ranks, and realize the horrible consequences if Lashkar-e-
Tayiba were to join with the Taliban and sectarians in a revolt in Pakistan. Pakistan is 
also fearful that, if they attempt to suppress Lashkar-e-Tayiba, the group will launch 
successful terrorist attacks in the West, which would be disastrous for Pakistan’s 
international standing. It is believed that the Pakistani Taliban sponsored the Times 
Square plot in 2010. Lashkar-e-Tayiba maintains contacts with al-Qaeda and assisted 
their members in escaping from Afghanistan and provided them shelter. Lashkar-e-
Tayiba is a jihadi organization whose primary goal is Indian controlled Kashmir but its 
members have been implicated in terror plots in Europe, North America and Australia. 
Although no Lashkar-e-Tayiba leaders have been identified as a part of these operations. 
They have also participated in actions within Pakistan, which their leaders have opposed. 
Sunni Islamic extremism is a net with nodes, not a hierarchal organization.99 
All groups and militants within this net hate the U.S., Israel, India, and Russia, 
finding different targets at different times. Despite Lashkar-e-Tayiba’s focus on India, no 
ideological barrier prevents it from acting against the West. In the jihadi world, militants 
come together for an operation, break apart, and then form different groups for a new 
plot. Lashkar-e-Tayiba’s most successful operation was the Mumbai attacks in 2008. 
While Lashkar-e-Tayiba’s targeting of Westerners earned it praise from international 
militants, it would have been pointless and wreckless for the Pakistani government to 
have coordinated this incident. Lievan discussed this incident with Pakistani experts and 
retired officers, who seem to believe that the Pakistani high command was not involved 
in ordering the attack on Mumbai. However, there is also sentiment that the operation 
                                                 
99. Lievan, “Pakistan,” 195–196. 
 56 
could not have been planned without Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (Pakistani 
Intelligence) officers knowing about it, or being involved in some capacity.100 
Since 2001, Pakistan has had a mixed performance when evaluating its ability to 
counter-domestic insurgency. These efforts consist of the regular army, a paramilitary 
Frontier Corps and the Frontier Constabulary for security along the border. Both the 
Frontier Corps and army lack counterinsurgency training and the proper equipment to 
deal with a mobile war against militants. They both had difficulty conducting operations, 
including clearing and holding territory. Pakistan has been more prepared for 
conventional conflict with India, not a population-centric approach to countering 
insurgency, which has sometimes alienated it from local inhabitants. The government has 
not been unable to provide the necessary development, aid and assistance to the people in 
order to gain their support for government and military operations. The lack of relief has 
made the army’s reliance on “scorched-earth” policies unpopular throughout Pakistan.101  
The difficulties in Pakistan are as attributable to political will, as to the limited 
capability of the government. Pakistan continues to distinguish between militant groups 
who operate in FATA and NWFP (North West Frontier Province) and use the tribal areas 
for training proxy groups destined for Afghanistan, Kashmir, India, and other areas. 
Pakistan has refused to target some militant groups. Elements in the Inter-Services 
Intelligence Directorate (Pakistani Intelligence), Frontier Corps and military have 
continued to support some of these organizations. Support of these groups, and their 
religious, political, and financial networks, has undermined the government’s ability to 
establish law and order. Pakistani operations have failed to capture or kill militant 
leaders. Additionally, the Pakistani army and the government have not been successful in 
mobilizing the country against the militant threat. Without the population’s support of 
military operations, it will be difficult to have a sustained commitment to “holding” 
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territory and rebuilding conflict-affected regions. There are over three million internally 
displaced persons seeking shelter and assistance across Pakistan, which is likely to 
inflame longstanding ethnic and sectarian issues in Pakistan.102 
1. Pakistani Government Support for Militants 
Pakistani support of militant groups can be traced back to its independence in 
1947, when it utilized Lashkars, or tribal forces, in an unsuccessful attempt to seize 
Kashmir. This resulted in the first Indian - Pakistani conventional war, which ended in 
the United Nations imposing demarcated areas to Pakistan and India. During Operation 
Gibraltar in 1965, Pakistan used approximately 30,000 infiltrators in Indian administered 
Kashmir to create bases and conduct sabotage in the attempt to facilitate conventional 
troops being introduced into the conflict. Prior to launching operation Gibraltar, Pakistan 
concluded that Kashmir possessed key elements that made it vulnerable to guerrilla 
tactics. This included a worthy cause, challenging terrain, a resolute and warlike people 
in the Pakistanis, a sympathetic local population, the ready availability of weapons and 
equipment, and greater leadership and discipline of the guerillas. Operation Gibraltar was 
successful in starting the second conventional Indian- Pakistani war, which ended in a 
stalemate.103  
Pakistani assistance of Islamist groups in Afghanistan began at least five years 
prior to the Soviet invasion in 1979. These efforts intensified after the Soviet invasion in 
conjunction with U.S. and Saudi assistance. As the Soviet presence grew, Pakistan 
employed religious groups including Jamaat-e-Islami and the Jamiat-e-Ulema Islami, to 
establish Pakistani based militant groups that could operate in Afghanistan. The success 
of the mujahideen in repelling the Soviets from Afghanistan led Pakistan to believe that if 
militants could defeat nuclear power Russia, the same tactics could defeat India 
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administered Kashmir. Many mujahideen veterans from Afghanistan were redeployed 
following the Soviet withdrawal to the Kashmir front, and used to establish training bases 
in Pakistan and Afghanistan.104  
There are at least three different types of Pakistani militant groups that receive 
government support. First, are groups like Lashkar-e-Tayiba and Mullah Mohammad 
Omar’s Taliban, which were cultivated as state assets, and remain as such. A second 
group comprises militant organizations, which have a history of state patronage, and have 
long served in Afghanistan and India. After Pakistan supported the U.S. led invasion of 
Afghanistan in 2001, these groups turned on the government and launched attacks against 
the army, Inter-Services Intelligence Directorate (Pakistani Intelligence), Pakistan’s 
civilian leadership, and President Musharraf. Some Deobandi militant groups aligned 
with Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan. Pakistan has chosen not to eliminate these groups that 
have targeted the state. The strategy seems to be to target the individual and deter the 
group from future attacks in Pakistan. The group may be allowed to survive, because it 
could be valuable to Pakistan in the future. The third group consists of militants like 
Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan, who in some cases, the government has supported and then 
negotiated peace deals. Some of these groups have been targeted when they posed too 
much of a threat to the state. Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan has utilized charismatic leaders 
who effectively exploit local grievances and coerce the local population through 
intimidation and assassination. This occurs in regions where there is little state authority,  
or where Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan has active state assistance. The power of these 
groups is expanded through violence, or the threat of violence, while providing basic 
services where state influence is weak. Pakistan has used varying methods to deal with 
Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan leaders which include military options but they have also 
been willing to negotiate peace deals on terms favorable to the militants.105 
Pakistan’s willingness to use militant groups to facilitate foreign policy and 
national defense, may have fulfilled its short-term goals, but it seems that it is now 
causing more instability than it solves. Pakistan does not appear to have the desire or 
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ability to fully control these groups who threaten Pakistan, whether they care to realize it 
or not, and the West. The groups in FATA have the ability and motivation to strike the 
U.S. homeland and its assets and allies abroad. There is a need for the U.S. to have the 
ability to proactively intervene in FATA to defend itself and Western allies from the 
evolving asymmetric threat that emanates from this region. 
Madrassahs compensated to an extent for the weak state of Pakistani public 
education but a small number of madrassahs adhering to Wahhabism and other 
ultraconservative schools of Islam veered away from their educational missions and 
toward political Islam. This trend was exacerbated first by the Islamic resistance to the 
Soviet presence in Afghanistan, and secondly by the dispute over Kashmir by India and 
Pakistan. Even though this new brand of Islam differed significantly from the open, 
inclusive Sufism inspired variety practiced in Pakistan, politicians found the Islamists and 
their political parties useful pawns in their struggles for power in Islamabad.106  
After 9/11, more Pakistani youth began turning to religious groups to address 
their grievances. This is due at least in part because of the religious group’s persistent 
attack on the credibility of civilian institutions and leadership. Imams, religious 
leadership of a given mosque, may target parents to send their children to particular 
madrassahs for indoctrination. Once ensconced at the madrassah, the student may be 
recruited by affiliated tanzeems (militant groups) and designated to go to a specific camp 
for military training. Another method to attract potential militant manpower involves 
inviting specific speakers to address congregations at a mosque. The speaker may address 
various aspects of the Indian conflict and abuses in Kashmir. Smaller meetings are 
subsequently arranged on related topics. This allows the organization to continue 
whittling down the potential pool of recruits both through supply-side and demand-side 
evaluations. Religious revivalism such as this could increase the base of potential 
sympathizers of Islamist and militant organizations who could in turn be recruited by 
tanzeems. Further, this trend has created an environment that is likely more favorable for 
the operations of such organizations. Within this environment several recent events and 
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U.S. actions have motivated a deep sense of injustice and created deep anti-U.S. 
sentiment. This includes the ongoing Israeli occupation, the wide-ranging perception that 
Israel acts with the support of the United States and the failure to obtain a secure 
Palestinian state. The belief that the United States buttresses the Gulf state monarchies, 
and provides unstinting support to the Pakistani Army, has also engendered cynicism and 
antipathy toward the United States and its claim to support democracy among wide 
segments of the civilian polity.107  
Considering that public schools educate about seventy percent of Pakistan’s full-
time students, compared to three percent or less for madrassahs, public schools probably 
deserve more scrutiny than they receive at present. Moreover, surveys of students in 
public, private, and religious schools demonstrate that while madrassah students are more 
likely to support jihad and outright war with India, public school students also show 
propensity towards the same attitudes.  
Fair’s survey also suggests the household as a new focus of attention. The vast 
majority of the households knew of their family member’s decision to pursue militancy, 
and many within the household actively refused to grant permission. More research is 
needed to understand the dynamics of household decision making, and how families may 
be mobilized to discourage such actions by family members.108 
Radicalization and recruitment of militants in FATA is not just limited to 
madrassah students. The base of future militants exists not only in madrassahs, but also in 
public schools, private schools, and among the uneducated. These feelings, which 
predispose a Pashtun toward radicalization, are a part of Pashtunwali, and are 
manipulated by the Taliban and al-Qaeda, while the Pakistani government views it as a 
convenient and strategic force multiplier. Focusing on family interaction and structure, 
may give a true and clear view of the path to militancy.   
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C. SENTIMENT OF THE POPULATION 
“Kill one enemy, make ten.”109 
–Pashtun saying 
 
1. New American Foundation Poll 
Based on the results of the 2010 public opinion poll of FATA residents by New 
America Foundation, 76 percent are against U.S. drone strikes in FATA (Figure 4). Much 
of this sentiment may have to do with 48 percent of FATA residents believing that drones 
largely kill civilians and 33 percent believing drones kill both civilians and militants 
(Figure 5). Only 16 percent felt that drones accurately targeted militants (Figure 5). If the 
people have FATA do not know the accuracy of drones then this program will not have 
the support of the people. Seventy-seven percent felt that the real purpose of the U.S. war 
on terrorism was to divide the Muslim world to ensure U.S. domination (Figure 6). 
FATA residents are not aware of the purpose of U.S. drone strikes and believe we are 
killing innocent civilians to ensure our domination. Until we change these basic ideas, 
drone warfare will not be understood or supported in FATA. 
It is not surprising that 87 percent of FATA residents opposed U.S. military action 
against al-Qaeda and the Taliban (Figure 7). This is consistent with Pashtunwali and the 
resistance to outside intervention. However, 69 percent supported Pakistani military 
intervention against al-Qaeda and the Taliban (Figure 8). Outside intervention by the 
Pakistani military assisting FATA would be against Pashtunwali, but probably less so 
than accepting western military assistance. In contrast to these findings, Taj specifically 
references the people of Waziristan suffering from the collateral damage inflicted by the 
Pakistani army’s use of long range artillery and air strikes, which are not as accurate as 
drone strikes.110 Suicide bombings were often or sometimes justified against the U.S. 
military by 59 percent of FATA residents (Figure 9). Eighty-three percent felt that suicide 
bombings were never or rarely justified against Pakistani military and police (Figure 10). 
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The support for suicide bombings against U.S. forces would indicate the FATA residents 
supporting defending themselves against the aggression of an outsider. Honor and 
revenge of Pashtunwali would require Pashtun to act against the U.S.  
Figure 11 illustrates that most FATA residents believe the U.S. is the biggest 
threat to their safety. When considering who was most responsible for violence in FATA, 
40 percent blamed the U.S., followed by traditional enemy India receiving 13 percent of 
the blame (Figure 12). These findings are consistent with the views of FATA residents 
that drone strikes mostly target civilians in furtherance of U.S. domination and 
destruction of the Muslim world. Militant groups combined only received 22 percent of 
fault for violence in FATA. A solid majority of FATA residents oppose the presence of 
Taliban and al-Qaeda groups in FATA as depicted in Figure 13. This indicates that 
FATA residents may not truly support militancy as initially believed. There may be 
alternatives to militancy for FATA residents which need to be researched to end the 
seemingly endless flow of militants that al-Qaeda and the Taliban generate. 
 
 













Figure 7.   FATA residents who support or oppose U.S. military action against al-Qaeda 
and Taliban (From Thorp, 2010). 
 
 
Figure 8.   FATA residents who support of oppose Pakistani military action against al-
Qaeda and Taliban (From Thorp, 2010). 
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Figure 9.   Justification of suicide bombings against U.S. military (From Thorp, 2010). 
 
 





Figure 11.   Countries or groups who pose the greatest threat to personal safety (From 
Thorp, 2010). 
 




Figure 13.   FATA residents who support or oppose the presence of fighters inside FATA 
(From Thorp, 2010). 
2. Pew Research Center 
The Pew Research Center conducted a face-to-face survey of 1,206 Pakistani 
adults from March 28 to April 13, 2012. The survey is representative of 82 percent of 
Pakistan. FATA and other regions were excluded due to security reasons. It found that 
the number of Pakistanis who consider the U.S. an enemy has continued to rise. Seventy-
four percent now consider the U.S. enemy, up from 69 percent in 2012 and 64 percent 
three years ago. Only 17 percent support U.S. drone strikes against leaders of extremist 
groups, even if they are conducted with Pakistani government. In 2009, 53 percent of 
Pakistanis supported the use of its own military to target extremists in FATA and 
neighboring Khyber Pakhtunkhwa. Today, 32 percent favor such measures.111   
The number of Pakistanis who view the U.S. as the enemy continues to rise 
steadily and the drone warfare program receives little support. Despite the aide the U.S. 
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provides to Pakistan, it is clear there are issues with our policies in this nation. The anti-
Americanism that is revealed must in some way be drawn from drone strikes. The 
findings of the Pew Center Research are similar to the findings of the Public Opinion in 
Pakistan’s Tribal Regions poll conducted by New America Foundation with the 
exception of Figure 13. In the Pew Center Research which did not include FATA 
residents, the majority of the population does not favor the use of Pakistani forces to fight 
militancy. In the New America Foundation poll which polled FATA residents only, 69 
percent supported the use of the Pakistani military. The fact that New America 
Foundation only interviewed FATA residents and the Pew Research Center did not 
interview FATA residents may explain why so many in FATA supported the use of the 
military. FATA residents, who live under al-Qaeda and Taliban oppression, are desperate 
for assistance and would prefer the military over militants.    
D. CONCLUSION 
The militancy that exists in FATA today was created by the Pakistani government 
in the 1970s. al-Qaeda and Taliban linked militant groups today operate in Pakistan, 
especially the tribal regions, while the government is either incapable or unwilling to 
eliminate these groups. Pakistan has used militant groups to deal with traditional border 
rival India and maintain influence in Afghanistan. It is likely Pakistan prefers to allow 
militant groups to exist for use in asymmetrical warfare or to further foreign policy 
initiatives. Many of these groups have been able to find refuge in the tribal regions. U.S. 
drone strikes within FATA are humiliating in Pashtunwali and must be avenged by the 
Pashtun. Charismatic militant leaders are able to recruit Pashtun tribesmen who are 
driven by the values of an exaggerated sense of honor, revenge and the rejection of 
outsiders. Drones may also provide motivation for the continuance of the existing 
accidental guerilla syndrome which has plagued FATA by giving Pashtun tribesmen 
incentive to fight with takfiri elements. The relationship between militants and Pashtun 
explains the animosity and resentment FATA residents have for the U.S., its ally Israel 
and drone warfare.  
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IV. DRONE WARFARE 
“There’s a risk of driving (al-Qaeda and its allies) farther and farther into Pakistan, into 




A. CONFLICTING RESULTS  
Drones offer advanced surveillance capabilities because of their visual sensors, 
long flight times, and flexibility to rapidly move to new areas. The ability to weaponize 
these surveillance platforms makes them tremendously valuable to U.S. officials, who 
need to take immediate lethal action based on surveillance. While drone use in Pakistan 
has been credited with substantial political and social blowback in the form of anti-
Americanism, there is no publicly available study of the strategic effects of drone 
campaigns. Empirical data suggests drone strikes are correlated with decreasing militant 
violence, though there is no data to support the argument that strikes cause decreases in 
violence. Data indicates that drone strikes are correlated with a reduction in militant 
violence, but it cannot be determined if this is long-term. These decreases appear to only 
temporarily interrupt militant operations because soon after the number of drone strikes 
decreases, militant violence increases. There are no comprehensive measures for efficacy 
of drone strikes. The few empirical studies available do not contain enough data for broad 
conclusions.113 In reviewing the history of this tactic, it is difficult to draw definitive 
conclusions about the effectiveness of drone warfare as a proactive self-defense measure. 
For every successful drone strike, there are drawbacks which may decrease the value of 
future drone operations by enflaming local populations and creating resentment toward 
the West. In the end, we must ask if the successful targeting of militants is worth the 
potential collateral issues which may not be immediately apparent.  
                                                 
112. Greg Miller, “U.S. Missile Strikes Said to Take Heavy Toll on al-Qaeda,” Los Angeles Times, 
March 22, 2009. 
113. Andrew Foust and Ashley S. Boyle, “The Strategic Context of Lethal Drones A Framework For 
Discussion,” American Security Project Perspective (August 16, 2012): 7. 
 70 
The CIA has particularly utilized armed drone strikes as a reliable method for 
limited strikes against high-value targets in otherwise inaccessible places. This includes 
Pakistan where officials have quietly accepted their use. Collecting data on drone strikes 
is difficult and the program is classified to various degrees within the U.S. government. 
Different aspects have been leaked to reporters but there is no way to accurately confirm 
that these accounts reflect the actual process by which drone strikes are decided and 
carried out. Analysis is limited because researchers are forced to gather information from 
other sources. FATA is considered off-limits to foreigners. Most public data available 
about drone strikes comes from government sources, either Pakistan or the U.S., which 
introduces unavoidable bias in reporting. Governments such as the U.S. and Pakistan do 
not provide official tallies of drone strikes or even the locations of where they occur. The 
public is forced to rely on unverifiable media accounts.114 Poor security prevents media 
organizations from accessing the “lawless Taliban-controlled area” such as Waziristan. 
Militants themselves manipulate the scenes of drone strikes to provide messages to 
Taliban or al-Qaeda affiliated media persons and Pakistani officials sympathetic to the 
terrorists.115 The U.S. may benefit from transparency about its drone warfare program. 
Without independent and unbiased news accounts, the world’s opinion is shaped by the 
Pakistani government and local reports which may be manipulated by the militants.     
1. Limited Options and Response  
Without decisive Pakistani military action, America has decided the best way to 
protect its interests in the region is through drone strikes. The Taliban has admitted that 
they have been adversely affected by drone strikes but they insist they will win the war in 
the end. Drone strikes prompt changes in militant behavior and cause militants to change 
locations quickly. It is difficult to get independent assessment of the attacks in North 
Waziristan where the majority have occurred. Most who live there are too afraid to speak 
out about the subject. Interviews of residents found sentiment supporting drones because 
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they target the right people. Those who disapproved stated it was because drones target 
the innocent. One resident preferred drones because the Pakistani army does not respect 
the honor of their men and women. Many North Waziristan residents stated that foreign 
fighters were being targeted by drones including Arabs, Uzbeks and Tajiks.116  
In 2010, 90 percent of drone strikes occurred in North Waziristan because the 
Pakistani army is either unwilling or unable to clear out insurgent groups. The military 
has intervened in the six other agencies of FATA but not North Waziristan which is a 
base of the Haqqani network, al-Qaeda, foreign fighters and local Taliban militants. 
Pakistan views these groups as a hedge against Indian influence in the region and the 
Haqqani network has long been considered an asset of Pakistani military intelligence.117 
Issues such as these, need to be resolved between the U.S. and Pakistan. The U.S. is 
currently utilizing drones to address a problem within Pakistan that poses a threat to the 
U.S. homeland. The optimal solution to militancy within Pakistan is for them to handle 
the situation and not rely on the U.S. 
Peter Bergin categorizes drone strikes as the least bad option for the U.S. in 
Pakistan. We cannot send ground troops in for fear of starting a war with Pakistan. 
Drones are a safe way for the U.S. to pursue al-Qaeda and Taliban leaders without a 
really massive negative reaction from Islamabad. However, he notes that Pakistan has 
tempered their anger over drone strikes at times because they realize the strategic 
necessity for the U.S. to target Taliban leaders like Baitalluh Mehsud, who is believed to 
have masterminded the assassination of Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto in 2007. 
He believes drone strikes are a tactic and not a strategy to deal with insurgency in 
Pakistan. Drones should be used with political and economic development in the areas 
producing militants. Bergin also mentioned the importance of militant surrender, laying 
down their arms, and signing peace deals as opposed to lethal drone strikes.118 Bergin’s 
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comments endorse the theory that drones need to be utilized within a comprehensive 
counterinsurgency program. There must be viable options available for the U.S. to utilize 
in addition to or in place of drone strikes. Lethal targeting of militants in a foreign 
country is not a sustainable strategy that will lead to stability in the region.  
A Taliban spokesman noted that short term problems of drone strikes include 
martyrdom and realignment in ranks but their command and control system is very 
strong. The new blood inspires courage and power. There are many residents of the tribal 
areas that believe U.S. drone strikes are successfully being used as propaganda tools by 
the militants. Pakistani journalist and militant expert Rahimullah Yusufzai asks how 
many “common militants” or people must die to kill militant leaders such as Dr. Ayman 
al-Zawahiri?119 These comments illustrate the damage that collateral damage and civilian 
casualties can have on the people of FATA. For every drone strike that occurs in FATA, 
the impact is felt by the entire community. Whether the target is considered high-value or 
low-value, drone strikes can adversely affect the local population, which may create 
future militants or strengthen radicalization.   
In February of 2011, senior Pakistani officials asked the Obama administration to 
put new restraints on a targeted-killing program that the government in Islamabad has 
secretly authorized for years. The CIA is increasingly killing “mere foot soldiers,” a 
senior Pakistani official said, adding that the issue has come up in discussions in 
Washington involving President Asif Ali Zardari. The official said Pakistan has pressed 
the Americans “to find better targets, do it more sparingly and be a little less gung-ho.” 
Experts who track the strikes closely said a program that began with intermittent lethal 
attacks on al-Qaeda leaders has evolved into a campaign that seems primarily focused on 
lower-level fighters. Peter Bergen, a director at the New America Foundation, said data 
on the strikes indicate that 94 percent of those killed are lower-level militants. He found it 
hard to make the case for that many militants being able to threaten the U.S. in some way 
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and added that targeted killings are about leaders not blanket dispensation.120 
Considering the potential collateral damage that drones can create, they should be utilized 
for high-value targets only. If a low-level militant has no command and control value, is 
the drone strike worth the collateral damage or civilian casualties it may cause? The U.S. 
should have a strategy to deal with low-level militants rather than killing them, the effects 
may be counterproductive to regional stability.    
During the summer of 2011, the White House put new restrictions on CIA drone 
strikes in the wake of concerns that the program was primarily targeting lower-level 
militants while provoking anger in Pakistan. Since then, according to an independent 
analysis, the strikes have yielded a significant increase in the percentage of people killed 
whom the government considers “high-value targets” but the program is still killing 
mainly rank-and-file fighters. The changes grew out of an internal Obama administration 
debate in the wake of a March 17 drone attack that the government of Pakistan 
condemned as a mistake, saying it killed more than 40 civilians. The U.S. says the attack 
killed “a large group of heavily armed men … all of whom acted in a manner consistent 
with al-Qaeda-linked militants.” Dennis C. Blair, who was ousted in 2010 as President 
Obama’s director of national intelligence, has criticized such strikes, saying there is little 
point in killing easily replaceable foot soldiers if the cost is public outrage in Pakistan. 
Similar concerns have been expressed within the administration.121  
2. Categories and Impact 
The CIA classifies its drone strikes into two categories. In one type, known as 
“personality strikes,” the agency tracks and targets a specific person who has been placed 
on a “kill list” because he has been deemed a threat to the United States. The other type, 
known as “signature strikes,” is the one primarily affected by the new rules. In those 
attacks, the CIA watches a group of suspected militants through drone surveillance video 
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and other means until officials are satisfied that the targets are plotting or carrying out 
attacks against U.S. troops or American interests, officials have said. The names of those 
militants are not necessarily known. On numerous occasions, senior militant figures on 
target lists were killed in signature strikes, U.S. officials say, and their identities were 
discovered only afterward.122 Authorizing a lethal drone strike is difficult to do, based 
merely on a group’s behavior. The U.S. must limit these types of operations and ensure 
that they are accurately targeting high-value militants. Otherwise, the U.S. may be 
targeting low-value militants, which is not worth the risk of collateral damage or civilian 
casualties.  
In early 2012, then White House counterterrorism advisor John Brennan stated 
that “the core al-Qaeda leadership is a shadow of its former self,” based on documents 
seized in bin Laden’s compound in Abbottabad. Bin Laden was struggling to attract new 
recruits when he was killed and had acknowledged “disaster after disaster” and even 
urged his leaders to flee the tribal regions and go to places “away from aircraft 
photography and bombardment.” Brennan claimed that the “precision” of drones has 
limited collateral damage and civilian deaths would be much higher if conventional 
military force were used. Targeted strikes “can be a wise choice” because they eliminate 
the need for “large, intrusive military deployments [that] risk playing into al-Qaeda’s 
strategy of trying to draw us into long, costly wars that drain us financially, inflame anti-
American resentment and inspire the next generation of terrorists.”123 Drones provide 
access into areas where Pakistani forces will not go and U.S. forces cannot go. When 
utilized, drones are more accurate than Pakistani army operations.124 Intelligence and 
technology improvements now allow U.S. officials to forgo an opportunity to kill a senior 
militant to get a clearer shot with less potential for collateral damage or casualties. The 
fear of never getting the chance to target a militant is less of a concern.125  
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Even former CIA officials who describe the drone program as essential said they 
have noted how infrequently they recognized the names of those killed during the barrage 
of strikes in the past year. The CIA declined to comment on a program that the agency 
refuses to acknowledge publicly but U.S. officials familiar with drone operations said the 
strikes are hitting important al-Qaeda operatives and are critical to keeping the United 
States safe. “This effort has evolved because our intelligence has improved greatly over 
the years, and we’re able to identify not just senior terrorists, but also al-Qaeda foot 
soldiers, who are planning attacks on our homeland and our troops in Afghanistan,” said 
a U.S. official, who spoke on the condition of anonymity to discuss the classified 
program, “We would be remiss if we didn’t go after people who have American blood on 
their hands,” the official said.126 While being precise and providing extended reach to the 
U.S., drones cannot be overly relied upon by decision makers to target militant foot 
soldiers. The U.S. needs to reach agreements with Pakistan to develop a strategy to 
effectively deal with a low-level militant rather than a lethal drone strike and the 
possibility of collateral damage and civilian deaths. 
While the U.S. may feel it is targeting militants in self-defense, the impact is 
inevitably felt in FATA. Drone warfare does not hold territory which allows militants to 
return.127 After the strike, life resumes in the region. The militant may be eliminated but 
the group adapts and survives. “You have to hold the ground permanently after cleaning 
up the militants rather than leaving the footprints of boots,” says a senior security official, 
citing military operations in Swat, Bajaur, South Waziristan, and other areas, as well as 
the army’s commitment to help victims of the country’s devastating floods.128 A dead 
terrorist does not allow for intelligence gathering and creates more martyrs.129 There is 
no opportunity to interview the dead militant and recover evidence such as cell phones or 
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laptop computers. Once a militant is killed by a U.S. drone strike, they may become a 
martyr figure to aspiring jihadists. Militants intentionally conduct business in civilian 
areas to maximize civilian deaths, which can be used to rally anti-American sentiment 
and recruit future militants. Drone strikes were seen by militants as cowardly, and they 
sought out locals with violence, based on strong feelings of revenge. Without the holding 
of territory after a drone strike, the civilian population remains vulnerable to retaliation 
and retribution. Dislike of drones doesn’t infer support of al-Qaeda and the Taliban. 
Many FATA residents are caught between drones and militancy.130 Drones impact both 
residents and militants within FATA. There are some in FATA who are trying to survive 
militant domination and avoid drone strikes. The U.S. must limit the damage inflicted on 
non-radicalized residents for fear of creating new militants and fueling anti-western 
sentiment. 
B. CASE STUDIES 
“When the drones hit, they don’t see children, they don’t see anybody. They kill women, 
children, they kill everybody. . . I am part of the answer . . . I’m avenging the attack.”131 
 
–Faisal Shahzad, when asked at his trial how he could  
justify planting a bomb that could kill children in Times Square 
1. Mustafa Abu al-Yazid 
In June of 2010, Mustafa Abu al-Yazid, an Egyptian born founding member of al-
Qaeda, was killed in a U.S. drone in North Waziristan. He was described as the group’s 
number three in command, overseeing plots, recruitment, fundraising and internal 
security. While this is described as a blow to al-Qaeda, there seems to be an endless 
supply of number threes available as Yazid is at least the eighth number three leader that 
has died or been jailed since 2001. Reports indicate that Yazid’s wife, three daughters 
and a grandchild died in the drone strike.132  
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If Yazid was that easily replaceable to al-Qaeda, was he high value enough to 
warrant killing his entire family with a drone strike? Based on his position in al-Qaeda 
the strike was justified because of his command and control function. He managed 
recruitment, fundraising, future plots and internal security. His death will save Western 
lives but at what cost? Yazid’s wife, three daughters and grandchild died for an easily 
replaceable militant. Drone strikes like this show the need for alternative measures to 
lethal targeting by drones. The Pakistani government must assist the U.S. in providing 
less than lethal options for the U.S. to defend itself from threats that originate in this 
region.  
2. Najibullah Zazi 
In 2009, Najibullah Zazi and two colleagues traveled to Pakistan to fight with the 
Taliban. They were recruited by an al-Qaeda facilitator and taken to North Waziristan to 
meet with several al-Qaeda leaders. Zazi and two of his colleagues were then taken to an 
al-Qaeda training camp in South Waziristan. Zazi had an “epiphany” during his trips to 
North and South Waziristan and while in training they agreed to return to the U.S. and 
conduct martyrdom operations. He received further explosives training in South 
Waziristan prior to coming to the U.S. The training and recruiting Zazi received in FATA 
was critical to Zazi’s plot. Without the explosives training and technical experience Zazi 
would have had to rely on the Internet for instructions on how to build the device.133  
The case of Zazi and his group, show the seriousness of the threat that is posed to 
the U.S. from Pakistan. Zazi was recruited and trained in Pakistan for an operation within 
the U.S. homeland. Earlier in this research, the unwillingness of the Pakistani government 
to intervene in North Waziristan was discussed. The majority of drone strikes have 
occurred in this region, because of the inability and unwillingness of the Pakistanis to 
take action. Zazi is the perfect example of why the U.S. must proactively act to defend 
itself in FATA.   
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3. Baitullah Mehsud 
In August of 2009, Baitullah Mehsud, commander of the Pakistan Taliban, was 
killed in a drone strike on his father-in laws’s house in South Waziristan. Also killed in 
the attack were his wife, uncle, in-laws and eight others. Mehsud was responsible for the 
kidnapping of soldiers, coordinating suicide attacks throughout Pakistan and 
masterminding the assassination of Pakistan Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto.134 Prior to 
this successful drone strike, a previous drone attempt in July resulted in seventeen deaths 
and twenty-seven injuries when it is believed the U.S. targeted a militant base run by 
Mehsud. This was a week after another unsuccessful U.S. drone attempt in which dozens 
were killed at a Taliban funeral.135 Drone strikes are unpopular with the Pakistani people. 
Militants have even targeted the Pakistani government in the Punjabi heartland. After a 
March of 2009 attack on a police academy in Lahore, Mehsud stated the attack was “in 
retaliation for the continued drone strikes by the U.S. in collaboration with Pakistan on 
our people.”136  
There is little doubt about the threat that Mehsud posed to both the U.S. and 
Pakistan. What is most discouraging is that the U.S. had to target Mehsud with a drone 
strike, as opposed to cooperating with the Pakistani government to create a solution to 
eliminate the threat. This is especially true considering the damage that he had already 
done within Pakistan and the future destabilization his militant group presented. It is 
difficult to determine the collateral damage and civilian casualties that were inflicted by 
previous drone strikes that were unsuccessful in targeting Mehsud. Judging by the 
locations targeted, surely some of those killed were militants in some capacity but were 
their deaths worth the anger and resentment felt within FATA? Many of these militants 
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may have been best dealt with through less than lethal tactics. Collaboration with 
Pakistan could have made the targeting of Mehsud far more efficient with less collateral 
damage. 
C. NEW AMERICA DATABASE 
“Nevertheless, every one of these dead noncombatants represents an alienated family, a 
new desire for revenge, and more recruits for a militant movement that has grown 
exponentially even as drone strikes have increased.”137 
 
–David Kilcullen and Andrew McDonald Exum 
 
In 2013, there have been six drone strikes in Pakistan (Figure 14). Based on 
previous years documented, it appears the U.S. may not be as reliant on drone strikes as 
the number of strikes continues to steadily decline since 2010. This may be due to 
deteriorating relations with Pakistan. It is hard to attribute the decline to more selective 
targeting of high-value militant leaders as the Bush administration successfully targeted 
leaders about one-third of the time, while the Obama administration is at 13 percent. With 
48 strikes last year, there were only five confirmed civilian deaths (Table 1 and Figure 
15), which represent just two percent of drone casualties (Table 2 and Figure 16). 
Unknown identity deaths have declined since 2010 and civilian deaths declined notably 
from 2011 to 2012 (Table 1). In 2012, militant deaths increased with significant 
decreases in unknown identity deaths and civilian deaths (Table 2 and Figure 16). Table 2 
concludes with a total of the average percentages of deaths to militants, unknown 
individuals and civilians from 2004–2012. The death rate of civilians and unknown 
persons killed per strike has also dramatically decreased over the last few years (Figure 
16). Since 2010, less than one unknown person or civilian were killed in each drone 
strike. In 2012, 6.2 militants were killed per strike, while only 1 unknown or civilian was 
killed.138    
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The ratio of militant to civilian and unknown casualties was over six to one. Who 
exactly are these militants and why are they categorized as militants? Many FATA 
residents are caught between drone strikes and the militants who terrorize FATA. Not 
everyone is a Mehsud or an al-Qaeda or Taliban leader with command and control 
functions. Do all of these targeted militants need to be killed or can some be dealt with by 
less than lethal options with the assistance of the Pakistani government? The U.S. cannot 
stabilize this region by killing everyone who has some type of militant trait or has 
associated with a militant group. Many FATA residents are just trying to survive and 
would not deal with militants if they had safe options readily available. Placed in a non-
militant environment, many FATA residents would not have a need to become 
radicalized and less drone strikes which target reconcilable militants may deter some 
from seeking militant revenge against the West.    
 
 





Table 1.   Estimated Total Deaths from U.S. Drone Strikes in Pakistan, 2004–2013 (From 
New America Foundation, 2010). 















2013 44 53 3 5 0 0   47 58 
2012 197 317 19 31 5 5   221 349 
2011 304 488 31 36 56 64   367 600 
2010 555 960 38 50 16 21   611 1,028 
2009 241 508 44 136 66 80   354 721 
2008 157 265 49 54 23 28   229 347 
2004–
2007 43 76 16 18 95 107   155 200 
Total 1,533 2,658 200 330 261 305   1,963 3,293 
 
 




Figure 16.   Types of deaths per strike to militants and civilians (From New America 
Foundation, 2010) 
Statistics valid through February 11, 2013 
 
Table 2.   Types of Casualties Per Year (calculated using high and low ends of range) (From 
New America Foundation 2010).  
Year Militant Unknown Civilian 
2012 89% 9% 2% 
2011 80% 8–18% 1–15% 
2010 94% 5–6% 2–3% 
2009 69–70% 12–19% 11–19% 
2008 80–84% 16–21% 8–10% 
2004–7 35–43% 9–10% 54–61% 
TOTAL 84–85% 9–13% 14–19% 
 





The U.S. is capable of precisely targeting militants in the FATA region of 
Pakistan with drone strikes that have minimal collateral damage or civilian casualties. 
Drone strikes are being utilized less often than in the past. Drones may create recruiting 
opportunities and inspire further radicalization of militants but these events may have 
occurred without drone strikes. When leveraged, drones are accurate. Civilian and 
unknown identity casualties have decreased. Drones appear to have short-term value by 
hampering militant operations and planning but the long-term value remains to be seen. 
Militant organizations in FATA aligned with al-Qaeda and the Taliban seem to survive 
and adapt to drone strikes despite leaders being eliminated. The case studies showed the 
human toll and impact of individual drone strikes against militants of various levels. If 
not leveraged properly, drones have the potential to create more militancy and 
radicalization than they solve. Drones may be best utilized as a last resort tactic to deal 
with high-value militants who pose an imminent threat to the U.S. and its interests. 
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V. CONCLUSION AND POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
“The Jews love life, so that is what we shall take from them. We are going to win because 
they love life and we love death.”139 
–Sheikh Hassan Nasrallah 
 
A. CONCLUSION 
The U.S. drone warfare program is a tactic capable of accurately targeting 
identified militants to proactively defend the U.S. homeland and assets abroad. The threat 
from al-Qaeda and associated groups which train and thrive in FATA, aided by the 
Taliban, must be mitigated by the U.S. While there will inevitably be collateral damage 
and civilian casualties associated with drone strikes, it is a discriminate and proportional 
attempt to precisely target militants with minimal collateral damage. However, the U.S. 
must avoid becoming overly reliant on this method. Drones must remain a tactic and not 
become a policy which dictates foreign relations, the centerpiece of military operations or 
the favored tool of the intelligence community. Drones are not an effective substitute for 
securing the local population from militants. Even after successful drone strikes, militants 
eventually return to the regions they previously dominated because drones alone do not 
hold territory. Drone strikes will also inflame Pashtun values such as honor and shame 
which can manifest in the form of narcissistic rage and displaced aggression against U.S. 
interests and allies such as Israel. Militant leaders can benefit from the anger of Pashtun 
tribesmen inspired by drone strikes to further radicalize and recruit within FATA and 
strengthen their organization.     
To prevent itself from becoming overly dependent on drone strikes, the U.S. must 
reserve drones for high-value militants who have a command and control function within 
their terror organization. It should also be a last resort option. If a militant can be arrested 
or diplomatically detained, without compromising the safety and security of U.S. 
interests, it may be more beneficial to pursue non-lethal measures which allow for 
questioning and further intelligence gathering. The U.S. should avoid targeting easily 
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replaceable low-value militants who lack leadership responsibilities. The potential for 
losing the hearts and minds of FATA residents outweighs the benefits of targeting lower-
value militants.  
Drones will be best utilized as a tactic within a comprehensive counterinsurgency 
plan, because drones alone will not bring stability to any region of the world. After 
individual drone strikes, the local population must be secured and protected from the 
militants who force them into jihad or inspire radicalization. Ultimately, these efforts 
must be carefully coordinated by the Pakistani government as U.S. troops, or troops of 
any nation including Pakistan, would not be accepted in FATA. With Pakistan’s history 
of supporting militant organizations this does not seem likely. Until Pakistan is willing 
and able to be a consistent and valued partner in the war on terror, drones will remain a 
viable last resort option to counter the threat high-value militants in FATA pose to the 
U.S. What drones will not provide is a solution to instability in the region, and they will 
risk inspiring future jihadists to rally behind anti-West sentiment.  
Currently, the U.S. drone warfare program remains a covert program with little 
official comment from the government. This has ensured the operational security of the 
program but allowed U.S. citizens and world opinion to become cynical about its 
effectiveness and intent. Statistics and graphic images can easily be manipulated to 
become favorable propaganda for the Taliban or al-Qaeda. It also has allowed people to 
assume the worst and begin to question the use of drone technology within the U.S. 
homeland. Whether used in surveillance or weaponized, drones have made the public 
particularly sensitive to their domestic purpose. Drones are viewed as having little 
oversight which can lead to government abuse. Now that the potential for abuse is within 
our borders, the American public is beginning to ask more questions and scrutinize drone 
use more actively. The U.S. public has privacy concerns over government use of drones, 
and whether the U.S. government can lawfully target a U.S. citizen overseas, or 
domestically, with a lethal drone strike. Private citizens are beginning to seek approval to 
fly their own drones and the U.S. may soon see hostile nations or organizations targeting 
U.S. assets domestically or abroad with drone technology of their own.    
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B. POLICY RECOMMENDATIONS 
“This is the least indiscriminant, least inhumane tool we have. But until there is complete 
transparency, the public will not believe that.”140 
–C. Christine Fair on drone strikes 
 
Following are policy recommendations: 
• Increased transparency of the U.S. drone warfare program. U.S. drone 
operations and policy pertaining to it must become as public as reasonably 
possible without compromising the operational security of the program. 
Transparency will allow drone warfare to gain international legitimacy 
and acceptance.  
• Oversight that provides accountability of the U.S. drone warfare program. 
A working group should be assembled which brings together the relevant 
organizations (listed below) to coordinate a comprehensive oversight plan. 
Oversight and accountability will make the program more effective and 
also give it more legitimacy when combined with transparency.  
• The implementation of drone warfare as a tactic, not a strategy for dealing 
with militants within a comprehensive counterinsurgency operation. 
Counterinsurgency should also address economic and political factors in 
Pakistan. The effectiveness of drone strikes may improve with a greater 
understanding of the significance of the tribal nature of FATA.    
• The local population of FATA needs to be supported by ground based 
intervention after a drone strike. The value of eliminating militants 
through drone operations is diminished if the militant is easily replaced 
and militants return to area following the strike. The role of Pakistan 
cannot be diminished in this area.     
Oversight of drone warfare in the U.S. will be best achieved through a working 
group consisting of the intelligence community, military, Department of State (DoS), law 
enforcement community, Department of Justice (DoJ), congressional members and 
executive branch representation. The U.S. intelligence community would present specific 
cases to the working group depicting identified militants and the threat they pose. Does 
the militant pose an imminent and substantial threat that would justify lethal force? The 
military would advise on what type of support they could reasonably supply against the 
targeted individual. Can they conduct a capture operation that minimizes the risk of 
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collateral damage or civilian casualties? Military lawyers would also review the case to 
determine if lethal force was justified under military rules of engagement. DoS would 
advise on current conditions in the region and provide diplomatic alternatives to lethal 
force. Can an agreement be reached with the Pakistani government which allows for the 
U.S. to take custody of an identified militant? Law enforcement would review the ability 
to affect an arrest, take custody of the militant or gather further intelligence with the other 
intelligence agencies. DoJ lawyers would also look at the legality of a lethal strike. Is 
lethal force justified within a national security perspective? Congressional membership 
would represent the citizens of the U.S. to ensure measures taken were consistent with 
our values. This would give the people a voice in the process and facilitate open debate of 
drone operations. A representative for the office of the president would ensure direct 
communication with the White House.     
The goal of this working group would be to make a timely assessment about how 
to deal with specific militants who have been identified by the intelligence community. In 
order to ensure this is done in a timely manner, a “kill list” should be established as high-
value militants are identified so a strike can be authorized on short notice. Alternative 
measures to drone strikes should be considered among working group partners to ensure 
that this is the best option available at the moment. To keep collateral damage and 
civilian casualties to a minimum, military and DoJ lawyers should be available for 
immediate consultation before a drone launches an attack against a militant. When 
possible the Pakistani government should become a part of this working group without 
compromising the operational security of the program. Pakistan, and residents of FATA, 
will more likely to accept lethal targeting in their nation from the Pakistani government 
than the U.S. Much of the counterinsurgency support, including securing the local 
population, must also be conducted through the Pakistanis. Participation of the host 
nation in this process will make drone warfare far more effective.  
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